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REPARATIONS TALK: REPARATIONS FOR 
SLAVERY AND THE TORT LAW ANALOGY 
ALFRED L. BROPHY* 
Abstract: This Article examines the current landscape of reparations for 
slavery, identifying the contours of reparations lawsuits and exploring the 
ability of tort law to help apportion moral culpability in the reparations 
context. It first examines several possibilities for lawsuits for Jim Crow, 
discussing constitutional requirements and identif)'illg specific incidents-
such as l)llchings and Jim Crow legislation-that might be appropriate 
subjects of litigation. The Article then assesses the viability of obtaining 
reparations through tort and unjust enrichment claims by addressing issues 
such as causation and damages, exploring the obstacles presented by 
American law's liberalism, and identif)ing the various goals of reparations 
advocates. Finally, the Article moves beyond litigation to contemplate the 
ability of tort law to serve as a vehicle for framing discussions about moral 
culpability. It concludes with an optimistic assessment of the role of tort law 
in the reparations movement. 
INTRODUCTION 
Reparations talk! has reached a new level in the past two years. 
We have advanced well beyond the first generation of scholarship, 
* © 2004, Alfred L. Brophy, Professor of Law, University of Alabama. J.D., Columbia 
University; Ph.D., Harvard University. Contact author for reprint permission at abro-
phy@law.ua.edu or at the University of Alabama School of Law, Box 8i0382, Tuscaloosa, 
AL 3548i-0382. 
It was a great pleasure-and honor-to present an earlier version of these thoughts at 
the Boston College Third Hbrld Law JoumaCs symposium at Boston College Law School, 
where I spent the most enjoyable (and one of the most educational) years of my life. I 
would like to thank \Vasana Punyassena for organizing the symposium, as well as Erin Han, 
Joanna Bratt, Melissa Cook, Mike O'Donnell, Naomi Kaplan, and the rest of the Boston 
College Third Hbrld Law Journal for inviting me. The symposium reminded me of The 
Clash'sJoe Strummer's statement-widely publicized at the time of his death-that "If you 
ain't thinkin' about [huJman[sJ and God and law, then you ain't thinkin' about nothin'." 
See Jon Pareles, Joe Strurnrner Is Dead at 50; Political Rebel of Punk Era, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 
2002, at B6. Reparations talk combines all three of those! 
I would also like to thank Dedi Felman, John Dzienkowski, Sanford Katz, Sara Patter-
son, Angela Kupenda, Andrew R. Klein, David Lvons, David Bernstein, David Levine, Cal-
vin !\Iassey, Eric J. Miller, and David Thelen for discussing these issues with me. I also 
benefited greatly from the comments of participants of the University of Windsor Law 
School'sJune 2003 roundtable on reparations. 
1 With apologies to Mary Ann Glendon. Sec !\fARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK (1991). 
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written in the 1980s, that opened the idea that reparations for slavery 
and other racial crimes were possible and that identified the problems 
with lawsuits. Much of that scholarship was critical of the existing sys-
tem-critical of American law's liberalism and its seeming inability to 
provide a language for thinking about reparations.2 The second gen-
eration, building on prominent precedents like the Civil Liberties Act 
of 1988, which provided compensation to Japanese-Americans in-
terned during World War II, recognized that legislative reparations 
were possible. That scholarship contemplated what reparations might 
provide and how they might lead to interracial justice, as well as repa-
rations in specific contexts, like the Tulsa Race Riot.3 
2 The fountainhead of serious reparations talk within the legal academy is l\IariJ. l\Ia-
tsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. GR.-GL. L. REV. 
323 (1987). A generation earlier, Professor Bittker took those arguments seriously with his 
monograph, The Case for Black Reparations. See genemlly BORIS BITTKER, THE CASE I'OR 
BLACK REPARATIONS (1973). Bittker's book provides an important model for later repara-
tionists; he applies well-established civil rights law as a framework for understanding the 
moral case for reparations. Nevertheless, the time was not then ripe for reparations talk 
and his ideas sat and waited to make their appearance in the next g'eneration. 
Building on Matsuda, three other articles advanced the cause in significant ways. Two 
were student notes. See Tuneen E. Chisholm, Comment, Sweep Around Your Own Front Door: 
Examining the Argument for Legislative African ,-tlllerican Reparations, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 677 
(1999); Rhonda V. Magee, Note, The Master's Tools, 79 VA. L. REV. 863 (1993). Magee has 
recently expanded significantly upon her earlier work. See Rhonda V. Magee Andrews, The 
Third Reconstruction: An Alternative to Race Consciousness and Colorblindness in Post-Slavery 
.-tIllClica, 54 ALA. L. REV. 483 (2002). The third was Professor Westley's brilliant statement 
of the case for reparations from a moral standpoint. See Robert Westley, Alany Billions Gone: 
Is It Time to Reconsider the Case for Black Reparations?, 19 B.G 'DURD WORLD LJ. 429 (1998). 
3 The second generation is perhaps best represented by Professor Yamamoto's hu-
mane work, particularly Interracial Justice. See ERIC YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE 
(1999); see also Julie A. Su & Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical Coalitions: Theory and Praxis, ill 
CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY 379 (Francisco Valdes et al. 
eds., 2002); Eric K. y.'1mamoto, Conflict and Complicity: Justice Among Communities of Color; 2 
HARV. LATINO L. REV. 495 (1997); Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis: Race Theory and 
Political Lawyering Practice in Post-Civil Rights A,merica, 95 l\hCH. L. REV. 821 (1997); Eric K. 
Yamamoto, Racial Reparations: Japanese AlIlelican Redress and African .1merican Claims, 19 B.C. 
THIRD WORLD LJ. 477 (1998); Eric K. Yamamoto, Rethinking Alliances: .-tgency, Responsibility 
and Interracial Justice, 3 AsIAN PAC. AlII. LJ. 33 (1995). Professor y.'1mamoto's unceasing 
efforts to emphasize racial healing through reparations are critical, I believe, to advancing 
the cause of reparations. 
In the wake of the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, some states began investigating their 
own complicity in racial crimes, such as the Rosewood riot of 1923, which destroyed a 
black town in central Florida. The most ambitious of the state investigations was the com-
mission that investigated the 1921 Tulsa Race Riot. The commission was remarkably SllC-
cessful in recovering an understanding of the riot's origins in the racial violence of the 
United States after 'Vorld 'Var 1. Despite that history, however, there were no reparations 
paid. See generally ALFRED L. BROPHY, RECONSTRUCTING THE DREAMLAND: THE TULSA RIOT 
OF 1921 (2002). 
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Reparations talk is the focus of serious discussions on college 
campuses and on the editorial pages of leading newspapers.4 It has 
gained credibility throughout the world, as nations begin to discuss 
how they can repair past damage and obtain closure.5 Or, as Non-
tombi Tutu has said, "The honest discussion of reparations has come 
of age in the United States and the world. Maybe I should say that the 
world has come of age for the discussion of reparations."6 
Reparations has even infiltrated federal courtrooms around the 
country. In 1995, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed a law-
suit for reparations.7 In March of 2002, a class action case was filed in 
4 The growth in the public debate can be roughly gauged by a search for references to 
"slavery" and "reparations" in the same story in the "m;yor papers" database of Lexis-Nexis. 
There were 85 stories before 1991, 83 stories in 1995,103 in 1999,396 in 2000, and 1117 
in 200l. One suspects that the effect of September 11, 2001, is seen in a decline to 698 
stories in 2002. The decline is continuing. In the first quarter of 2003, there were only 105 
stories. Available at http://www.lexis.com (last visited Oct. 16, 2003). 
Another indicium of the importance of reparations for slavery within the legal acad-
emy is that the nation's finest law journals have begun to publish on the topic. In recent 
years the Harvard Law Review, Columbia Law Review, Texas Law Review, and Georgetown Law 
Journal have all published articles, essays, or comments devoted to reparations for slavery. 
See Alfred L. Brophy, Losing an Understanding of the Importance of Race, 80 TEX. L. REV. 911 
(2002); Kevin Hopkins, Forgive U.S. Our Debts? Righting the Wrongs of Slavery, 89 GEO. L. J. 
2531 (2001); Saul Levmore, Changes, AnticijJations, and Reparations, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1657 
(1999); Note, Bridging the Color Line: The Power of African-American Reparations to Redirect 
America's Future, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1689 (2002). Moreover, there are frequent, thoughtful 
discussions of reparations on the radio and the internet. See, e.g., Hugh LaFolIett & An-
drew Valls, Ideas & Issues (WETS-FM radio broadcast), available at http://www.etsu.edu/ 
philos/radio/valIs.htm (last visited Oct. 17,2003); Leading SelwlaTs Discuss "Forty Acres and a 
Mule: The Case for Black Reparations," at http:/ h~ww.columbia.edu/cu/news/vforum/03/ 
struggle_black_reparations/ (Mar. 10, 2003). 
5 Sec generally ELAZAR BARKAN, THE GUILT OF NATIONS: RESTITUTION AND NEGOTIAT-
ING HISTORICAL INJUSTICES (2000). 
6 Nontombi Tutu, Afterword of SHOULD AMERICA PAY? SLAVERY AND THE RAGING DE-
BATE OVER REPARATIONS 321, 322 (Raymond A. Winbush ed., 2003). 
7 Sec Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, III 1 (9th Cir. 1995). More recently, the United 
States Court of Claims entered summary judgment against plaintiffs seeking reparations for 
slavery based on an Equal Protection argument, who claimed that victims of slavery are enti-
tled to share in the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, which provided compensation to Japanese 
Americans interned during World War II. See Obadele v. United States, 52 Fed. CI. 432, 441, 
444 (2002). Other recent cases seeking reparations for slavery have been dismissed. See Ab-
dullah v. United States, No. 3:02-CV-1030, 2003 WL 1741922 (D. Conn. Mar. 25, 2003); Bell 
v. United States, No. 3:01-CV-0338-D, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14812 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (dis-
missing suit for reparations for slavery and obserYing that without a concrete, personal injury 
that i~ not abstract and that is not fairly traceable to government, plaintiff lacks standing); 
Powell v. United States, No. C94-01877 c\V, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8628 (N.D. Cal. 1994); 
Jackson v. United States, No. C94-01494 CW, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7872 (N.D. Cal. 1994); 
Lewin. United States, No. C94-01380 CW, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7868 (N.D. Cal. 1994). Cf 
United States v. Bridges, 46 F. Supp. 2d 462, 463 (E.D. Va. 1999) (defendant charged with tax 
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federal district court in New York.s In February, 2003, the victims of 
the 1921 Tulsa Race Riot filed a serious claim.9 
Legal scholars who oppose reparations are currently responding 
with a third generation of scholarship. Those opponents are taking 
reparations arguments much more seriously by closely parsing advo-
cates' legal claims. By doing so, they greatly expand the opportunity for 
serious discussion. 1o Serious debate always needs people to present op-
fraud for claiming non-existent reparations tax credit), affd, 217 F.3d 841 (4th Cir. 2000); 
Wilkins v. Commissioner, 120 T.C. 109 (2003) (denying tax credit for reparations for slavery). 
8 See Plaintiffs' Complaint & Jury Trial Demand, Farmer-Paellmann v. FleetBoston Fin. 
Corp., No. 02-CV-1862 (E.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 26, 2002). The complaint is available at 
http://www.nyed.uscourts.gov/02cvI862cmp.pdf and is conveniently reprinted in SHOULD 
AMERICA PAY?, supra note 6, at 354-66. Farmer-Paellmann has also filed suit in California. 
See Hurdle v. FleetBoston, No. CGC-02-412388 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Sept. 10, 2002). 
These and other cases are discussed in John S. Friedman, Corpomte Bill for SlavelY, NATION, 
r--lar. 10, 2003, at 6. The cases have recently been consolidated. See In IT African American 
Slave Descendant Litig., 231 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (j.P.r--I.L. 2002). There has also been ajoint 
motion to dismiss filed by the defendants. Some judicial opinions have addressed various 
problems with slave reparations suits. See, e.g., Cato, 70 F.3d at 1106-11. Nevertheless, the 
joint motion is the most comprehensive legal response yet available to slavery reparations 
claims. It advances four main claims: that the plaintiffs lack standing, that the statute of 
limitations bars claims, that the claims are barred by the political question doctrine, and 
that the plaintiffs have not alleged facts sufficient to support a cause of action. Of those 
claims, the most damaging in my mind are the statute of limitations and lack of standing 
claims, which might also be considered as a common law problem-a lack of connection 
between those who are harmed and those who are asserting a claim. The standing prob-
lem might be cured fairly easily by identifying people who are descended from those who 
were employed as slaves by the defendant companies and their predecessors. There may 
still be problems, as the defendants argue, that descendants are not the proper claim-
ants-that the claims must be asserted by a representative of the estate. See Memorandum 
in Support of Defendants' Joint Motion to Dismiss at 6-7, In re African American Slave 
Descendant Litig., 231 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (No. CV 02-7764). One suspects, 
however, that the intestate heirs-or testate, to the extent that there were wills-would be 
the appropriate representatives at this point. An obvious, enormous problem, which is not 
so easily handled, is the statute of limitations. I find it surprising that the motion, which 
was prepared by counsel from many of the nation's very finest law firms, has such limited 
discussion of the equitable tolling arguments. 
9 See Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, Alexander v. Oklahoma, No. 03-CV-133 
(N.D. Okla. filed Apr. 29, 2003), available at http://www.tulsareparations.org/Complaint 
2ndAmend.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2003); see also Brent Staples, Coming to Glips with the 
Unthinkable in Tulsa, N.Y. TIMES, March 16,2003, § 4, at 12 (discussing the lawsuit and con-
cluding, "The courts will have to decide whether or not the riot survivors have a plausible 
case. But in the moral sense at least, Tulsa and Oklahoma have already lost. They did so by 
failing to accept responsibility for one of the most blood-curdling events in Anlerican his-
tory."). Given the amount of discussion, I have to disagree with those who maintain that 
reparations talk is impoverished. See, e.g., Lee A. Harris, "Reparations" as a Dirty Word: The 
Norm Against Slavery Rcpamtions, 33 U. MEM. L. REV. 409, 435 (2003) ("To say the least, the 
literature on slavery reparations is threadbare."). 
10 Sometimes those who contribute to the discussion of the problems with reparations 
also support them. See generally Alfred L. Brophy, Some Conceptual and Legal Problems with 
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posite sides. Reparations discussion is expanding well beyond critical 
race scholars who first advanced reparations arguments, along with at-
tacks on law's liberalism. Now the arguments focus on the details of 
cases: the statute of limitations, identifYing the appropriate plaintiff 
class members and the appropriate defendants, and the cultural argu-
ments surrounding reparations. That third generation of scholarship 
also includes work by reparationists, which explores in deL-'lil what the 
case for reparations looks like and how it fits within well-established le-
gal principles. l1 And still, reparations scholarship and talk continues to 
grow. Our age of apology, coupled with some limited reparations in 
other contexts, is leading to calls for reparations beyond the context of 
slayery.l2 All of which points to the problems with every group seeking 
limited governmen tal resources: it is difficult to rank the claims of 
competing groups to government-funded reparations. I3 This third gen-
eration of scholarship is going to be very helpful in setting the agenda 
for future legislative (and perhaps court) action. Once we have a dia-
logue, we can more clearly see what we want to do about reparations. 
This Article is part of that third generation because it seeks to 
identifY how reparations lawsuits might work and how the law might 
be used to frame reparations claims to a legislature. Part I assesses the 
possibilities of lawsuits for Jim Crow. Part II then turns to the case for 
reparations for slavery through tort law and unjust enrichment. It 
deals with common objections to tort suits for reparations-such as 
causation and proof of damages. It then turns to the role that lawsuits 
might play in the cultural war over reparations. Part III discusses the 
goals of reparations, and whether reparations are well-suited toward 
meeting those goals. This Article concludes that using tort law for 
Reparations for Slavery, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SUR\,. AM. L. 497 (2003) (discussing problems with 
theories invoh'ing lawsuits and constitutionality of legislatively granted reparations, while 
suggesting ways that reparations might be implemented). Alfreda Robinson, for example, 
has recently explored how reparations claims might work against corporations. See Alfreda 
Robinson, C01jJOrate Social Responsibility and itjiicanitmelican Reparations:Jubilee, 55 RUTGERS 
L. REV. 309,358-84 (2003). 
11 See, e.g., Kim Forde-Mazrui, Taking the Right Seliously: ilmerica 's Moral Responsibility for 
Effects of Past Racial Disc/imination (2002), at http://papers.ssrn.com/soI3/delivery.cfm/ 
SSRN_ID311860_code020613630.pdf?abstractid'311860; Kaimipono Wenger, Slavery as a 
Takings Clause Violation (2003), at http://ssrn.com/abstract=420540. 
12 Sec, e.g., Pedro A. Malavet, RejJarations Theory and Postcolonial Puerto Rico: Some Prelimi-
nary Thoughts, 13 BERKELEY LA RAZA LJ. 387, 390-92 (2002); Ediberto Roman, Reparations 
and the Colonial Dilemma: The Insurmountable Hu rdles and let TransfoT/native Benefits, 13 BER-
KELEY LA RAZA L.J. 369, 371 (2002). 
13 See Eric Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Rej}{/rations for Slavery and Other Histmical Injus-
tices, 1 03 COLV~1. L. RE\,. 689, 722-23 (2003) (discussing the difficulty of ordering priority 
of clainls on govenllnent's scarce resources). 
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reparations may provide relief for some of the victims of slavery and 
Jim Crow. Most importantly, tort law is an ideal vehicle for framing 
discussions about moral culpability. In short, the time for serious dis-
cussion of reparations is now. The future of the movement undoubt-
edly will be determined in large part by our success in making a com-
pelling moral argument for reparations that gains political support. 
I. CONTEMPLATING LAWSUITS FOR JIM CROW 
In the United States, lawsuits are often the harbingers of social 
revolutions. We see lawsuits at the beginning of movements-and at 
the end of them, as well. We see suits when a movement is first gain-
ing momentum, because people turn to courts to work out their 
claims and to gain statements of their rights. We also see lawsuits at 
the end of social movements, when other methods have failed. 
Reparations lawsuits are part of a larger movement. That move-
ment has many goals, including bringing attention to the contribu-
tions that African Americans have made to the American economy 
and society, for which they received too little compensation, and cor-
recting that unjust under-compensation. The movement for repara-
tions for Jim Crow-the period between the end of Reconstruction 
and the beginning of the modern civil rights movement, when Afri-
can Americans were subject to state-sponsored discrimination in edu-
cation, housing, employment, and public accommodations-aims at 
the entire system of racial crimes during that era. Legislatures and 
municipalities passed acts that limited voting rights, provided grossly 
disproportionate funding of schools, and mandated racial segregation 
in housing and on streetcars. Private actors then followed the gov-
ernment's lead by limiting employment opportunities. Together, gov-
ernment and private actions led to dramatically limited opportunity 
for Mrican Americans to rise economically. There was a continuation 
of what United States Senator James Henry Hammond from South 
Carolina had referred to as a "mud-sill" class: former slaves and their 
descendants became the "defenseless scapegoat[sl" used for cheap 
labor while segregated from the life of the white community.14 A par-
14 See CONGo GLOBE app., 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 68, 71 (1858) (speech of Sen. Ham-
mond, Mar. 4, 1858); see also RALPH ELLISON, Going to the Territory. in THE COLLECTED Es-
SAYS OF RALPH ELLISON 591, 595 (john F. Callahan ed .• 1995) ("H:wing won its victory, the 
North could be selective in its memory, as well as in its priorities, while leaving it to the 
South to struggle with the national problems which developed following the end of Recon-
struction. And even the South became selective in its memory of the incidents that led to 
its rebellion and defeat. Of course a defenseless scapegoat was easily at hand, but my point 
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allel community developed, sometimes with benefits for those segre-
gated, but most often with low wages, long hours, and little opportu-
nity for advancement. I5 
A. Constitutiol1al Requirements 
When we are talking about lawsuits as the vehicle for reparations, 
we need to identify a class of plaintiffs and specific defendants and 
link them together with a cause of action. The United States Supreme 
Court requires a close connection between proof of harm and the 
remedy.I6 As the Supreme Court said in striking down minority-owned 
construction businesses in City of Richmond v. fA. Croson, Co Inpal1y: 
It is sheer speculation how many minority firms there would 
be in Richmond absen t past societal discrimination, just as it 
was sheer speculation how many minority medical students 
would have been admitted to the medical school at Davis ab-
sen t past discrimination in educational opportuIlltles. 
Defining these sorts of injuries as "identified discrimination" 
would give local governments license to create a patchwork 
of racial preferences based on statistical generalizations 
about any particular field of endeavor. ... These defects are 
readily apparent in this case. The 30% quota cannot in any 
realistic sense be tied to any injury suffered byanyoneP 
Requiring a close connection between harm and relief is inherent in 
Arnerican law, which looks to individual plaintiffs and individual de-
fendants. Reestablishing the requirement of a close connection be-
tween harm and relief, the Supreme Court stated repeatedly in the 
here is that by pushing significant details of our experience into the underground of un-
written history. we not only overlook much which is positive, but we blur our conceptions 
of where and who we are,"); CLARENCE J. !\[UNFORD, RACE AND REPARATIONS 207-21 
(1996). 
15 Seel\1uNFoRD, s!tjJl'{l note 14, at 207-21. 
16 For the requirements of reparations lawsuits, see Brophy, sujJ1'{l note 10, at 502-20 
(discussing the need to have identifiable plaintiffs and defendants, causation, and a cause 
of action); infra Part II (discussing the requirements of a lawsuit for reparations for slav-
ery). 
17 City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson, Co., 488 U.S. 469, 499 (1989); see Wygant v.Jackson 
Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276-77 (1986) ("Societal discrimination, without more, is too 
amorphous a basis for imposing a racially classified remedy .... [A] public employer ... 
must ensure that, before it embarks on an affirmative-action program, it has convincing 
evidence that remedial action is warranted. That is, it must have sufficient evidence to 
justify the conclusion that there has been prior discrimination.") (internal quotations 
omitted). 
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1980s and early 1990s that generalized societal discrimination cannot 
be the basis for supporting race-based affirmative action. ls In more 
recent years the Supreme Court has imposed similar lawsuit-like re-
strictions on Congress's powers under Section Five of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, referring to the limited power of findings of societal 
discrimination to support race-based action. 19 
The Supreme Court's increasingly strong demand for a connec-
tion between harm and relief is best evidenced in its school desegrega-
tion decisions. Desegregation injunctions permit, by their nature, a 
loose fit between past harm and current remedy; their purpose is mak-
ing a future that looks different from the past. Desegregation injunc-
tions attempt to create a school system that looks like what the school 
system might have looked like without the past illegal conduct. 20 
18 See, e.g., Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 909-10 (1996); Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 
515 U.S. 200, 220 (1995); Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274-776,288. 
19 See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368-74 (2001). 
20 Professor Fiss perceptively explored desegregation injunctions in The Civil Rights In-
junction: 
In contrast to damage judgments or criminal prosecutions, the injunction could 
more easily accommodate the group nature of the claim, it could provide the 
requisite specificity and continuing supervision over long periods of time, and it 
introduced a desired degree of softness-it has a prospective quality, and direc-
tives could easily be modified as the courts enhanced their understanding of 
the constitutional goal and how that goal might be achieved. 
OWEN M. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 87 (1978). Looking now at twenty-five years 
of subsequent development in injunctions, we might think that injunctions are being re-
formed to look more like traditional legal relief. As Professor Laycock has argued in a 
different context, the special nature of equity is being tamed and made to look increas-
ingly like legal relief. See generally DOUGLAS LAYCOCK. THE DEATH OF TilE IRREPARABLE 
INJURY RULE (1991). Indeed, a follower of Professor Laycock might be tempted to speak in 
terms of the resurrection of the connection between harm and remedy! Of course, one 
familiar with Joseph Story's Commelltmies on Equity would not find that surprising. For, 
more than 150 years ago, Justice Story was already trying to make equitable relief conform 
to legal relief. See generally JOSEPH STORY, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence as A.dminis-
tered, in ENGLAND AND AMERICA (1836). Cf PERRY MILLER, THE LIFE OF THE MIND IN 
AMERICA: FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR 121-43 (1965) (discussing the intel-
lectual elegance of the common law and the ways that jurists, particularly Story, sought to 
bring rationality to it). 
Similarly, when the demand was to compensate for the systematic and thorough harms 
of slavery, the Jim Crow era, or more subtle and recent forms of discrimination, cash pay-
ments seem particularly inadequate. The inadequacy stemmed from considerations much 
deeper than difficulties of measurement, for these same difficulties inhere in the repara-
tive injunction-in identifying the victims and perpetrators of the past wrong and knowing 
what conduct (e.g., preferences) would constitute adequate compensation. The inade-
quacy stemmed from the group nature of the underlying claim and a belief that only in-
kind benefits would effect a change in the status of the group. 
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The Supreme Court's decision in Grutter v. Bollinger may signal a 
change in the requirement that reparative action must be linked to 
harm. Indeed, GruttC1; by finding that diversity itself is a compelling 
state interest,21 produces an independent ground for race-conscious 
action that is completely separate from remedying past discrimination. 
Justice O'Connor's inclusion of a time limitation on the race-conscious 
action-she suggests twenty-five years-is particularly puzzling in this 
context.22 While it pays homage to the Court's previously announced 
requirement that race-conscious action have a definite stopping point, 
that limitation seems to come from out of thin air. There is no reason 
why the race-conscious action should last twenty-five, as opposed to ten, 
fifty, or one-hundred years. Moreover, if diversity itself is a compelling 
interest, then one wonders why there is a time limitation at all. Assum-
ing that we can take as good law that diversity (not remedying past dis-
crimination) is now a compelling state interest, that opens up great 
possibility for race-conscious action in school desegregation. Perhaps 
we will see a departure from the requirements of desegregation cases, 
like !vlissollli v. Jenkins, where the remedy must be designed to repair 
the constitutional harm. 23 In rejecting the need for an attempt to find 
non-racial bases, Jenkins supports a broad remedial program that may 
remove constitutional objections to reparations. 24 The larger effect of 
Gruttermay be to shift dialogue away from reparations and more toward 
consideration of race as part of a campaign for diversity. It remains to 
be seen what Grutter does to the race debate. Perhaps, in recognizing 
that diversity is a goal, we will move away from consideration of the past 
and the history of racial crimes and discrimination. 25 Or perhaps the de-
cision will reinforce consideration of race throughout American politics. 
\et the entire process of class action lawsuits-in which the plaintiff is little more than 
a stand-in for an entire group of claimants-has undergone such transformation that one 
is tempted to believe we have returned to the world Professor Lon Fuller described in The 
Forms and Limits of Adjudication. 
21 Grutterv. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2339 (2003). 
22 See id. at 2347. 
23 See l\{issouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 88 (1995). Of course, jenkins places limits on 
what COllrts can do and Grutteris dealing with what are essentially legislative and executive 
decisions. 
24 See Brophy, supra note 10, at 525-35 (discllssing the likely constitutional problems 
with reparations and suggesting what findings would be necessary to support them); Pos-
ner & Vermuele, sujJrrl note 13, at 711-25 (discussing the constitutional problems v.ith 
reparations for slawr),). 
25 See Stuart Eizenstat, Racial Preferences as Slavery RCj)(lI'atioll, L.A. TgIES, Mar. 31, 2003, 
at Bll. 
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There are other, important questions about the effect of Grutteron 
reparations. Grutter revitalizes race as a category of legal analysis and 
restores discussion of race to the center of contemporary American law. 
One wonders, however, if there is less need for discussion of repara-
tions, with its requirement of demonstrating how past harm has an ef-
fect on people today, now that there is an independent basis for race-
conscious action. Reparations may continue to be a way of justifying 
affirmative action, but now that diversity opens up a separate rationale, 
there is less need for discussing it. Nevertheless, the people who most 
need reparations-and the people it would help the most-may not be 
the same people who receive preferential treatment through diversity 
programs. 
B. Requirements forJim Crow Law Suits 
In brief, to succeed on a lawsuit for reparations for slavery or Jim 
Crow, plaintiffs will have to show that they (or someone for whom they 
hold the right to sue) were injured, that the injury was caused by some 
person who owed them a duty, and that the injury resulted in damage. 
Of course, all of this must have happened within the statute of limita-
tions.26 
26 Commentors have begun to explore in some depth the problems with the lawsuit 
against Aetna and CSX. See, e.g., Paige A. Fogarty, Speculating a Strategy: Suing Insurance 
Companies to Obtain Legislative Reparations for Slavery, 9 CONN. INS. LJ. 211, 224-41 (2002); 
Anthony Sebok, ProsaicJustice, LEGAL AFF., Sept. 10,2002, at 51 (evaluating the efficacy of 
relying on property law, rather than human rights law, in slavery reparations suits). 
Farmer-Paellmann framed the lawsuit in a way that created problems. There is no evidence 
linking her to any of the behavior of any of the defendants. At the very least, one would 
expect that a court would demand that the plaintiffs show a connection between the peo-
ple harmed by the defendants' predecessors and themselves. In essence, one might rea-
sonably demand that the plaintiffs show some connection between the defendants' prede-
cessors and their predecessors. See Fogarty, supra, at 233. 
A more credible suit would have located the descendants of slaves who worked for 
CSX's predecessors, or whose lives were insured by Aetna. One might, for instance, con-
struct a claim for the descendants of the slaves who worked on Isaac Royal's plantation in 
Barbados. Royal donated money made on that plantation to Harvard Law School. SeeJus-
tice Joseph Story, A Discourse Pronounced at the Funeral Obsequies of John Hooker 
Ashmun, Esq., Royal Professor of Law in Harvard University, Before the President, Fellows, 
and Faculty in the Chapel of the University (April 5, 1833). Because a donee takes a gift 
subject to all the claims against the donor, those descendan ts might assert a claim against 
Harvard Law School, as the stand-in for Isaac Royal. There would, of course, be serious 
problems with the statute of limitations. However, one might find a court-perhaps in 
Barbados-willing to toll the statute of limitations because the courts were unavailable to 
the plaintiffs at the time. One might also apply the rule that the statute of limitations does 
not begin to run on stolen pel'sonal property until a claim is made for its return. See Eliza-
beth Tyler Bates, Reparations for Slave Art, 55 ALA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004). 
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Some cases for Jim Crow crimes and discrimination seem particu-
larly compelling.27 The Tulsa riot lawsuit holds out promise, precisely 
because we are able to fit it into a framework that the law is able to rec-
ognize. There are identifiable plaintiffs-more than 100 people still 
survive who were alive during the riot and were victimized by it-and 
there are identifiable defendants-the city and state. Moreover, there 
are some identifiable causes of action that are particularly strong in the 
case of the city, which deputized hundreds of men who subsequently 
participated in the riot. The city and local units of the state guard also 
participated in the mass arrest of everyone in the black section of 
Tulsa.28 
The largest problem to overcome in the Tulsa litigation is the 
statute of limitations. Even there, a reasonable argument exists for 
tolling the statute of limitations: the courts were effectively unavail-
able at the time. When blacks tried to assert their legal rights, they 
were subject to lynchings and other violence-such as the destruction 
of their homes by rioters. Shortly after the riot, the Ku Klux Klan so 
dominated the state of Oklahoma and the Tulsa and Oklahoma City 
courts that Governor Jack \\Talton declared martial law throughout 
the state and convened a military tribunal to investigate the Klan. 
Blacks as well as others-like Native Americans and Greek immi-
grants-were subject to violence, which the Tulsa police department 
probably encouraged. At best, the department failed to intervene or 
27 Seyeral articles recently have made the case for reparations in the Jim Crow-rather 
than slavery-context. See Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Creating a Tmth and Reconciliation Commission for 
L)lnclting, 21 L. & INEQUALITY 263, 309-10 (2003); Emma Coleman Jordan, A History Les-
son: Reparationsfor nT/wt?, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SUR\,. AM. L. 557, 559 (2003). Both focus on the 
ugly legacy of lynching, which has captured the attention of historians in recent years. The 
new lynching studies offer detailed evidence of communities' complicity. As a result, lynch-
ing cases often offer compact sites for viewing both the evils of Jim Crow and for tracing 
out its effects on the pres en t. 
In many ways, Jim Crow cases are more compelling than reparations for slavery. Often, 
victims are still alive, the evidence is often stronger than in slavery cases, and instances of 
harm are closer in time than slavery. The common refrain-that all the slaves are dead-
does not apply to Jim Crow, where there are victims still Jiving. Reparations for Jim Crow 
may offer the way to bridge supporters and detractors of reparations for slavery. 
28 For more on the Tulsa riot, listen to Fresh Air (NPR radio broadcast, Feb. 22, 2000), avail-
able at http://freshair.npr.org/dayJajhtml?display=day&todayDate=02/22/2000 (last yisited 
No\,. 12, 2003); Talking History (Dec. 3, 2002), available at http://talkinghistory. 
oah.org/shows/2002/TulsaRiots.mp3 (last visited Oct. 17,2003); The Tavis Smiley Show (NPR 
radio broadcast, Feb. 26, 2003), available at http://www.npr.org/rundmVTIs /rundown. 
php?prgId=14&prgDate=26-Feb-2003 (last visited Oct. 17, 2003). Sec generally BROPHY, supra 
note 3. 
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investigate. No fair-minded observer will claim that Tulsa riot victims 
had a chance at justice in the Oklahoma state courts at the time. 
Unavailability of relief is a key situation in which courts typically 
toll the statute of limitations.29 Here, the argument is as follows: Be-
cause courts were unavailable, we should not expect plaintiffs to have 
sought relief. vVe then enter into an equitable argument about whether 
the complete failure of the legal system to provide justice should, at 
least in limited circumstances, be remedied. Particularly where some-
one asserts claims based on heinous and discrete crimes-rather than 
general societal discrimination-the case for tolling the statute of limi-
tations is compelling. In such a situation, the courts serve their in-
tended function in ways that work well. Courts in the Tulsa riot cases 
can prmide relief in limited cases where there are identifiable victims 
and defendants, where there is a well-defined cause of action, and 
where damages are proven with specificity and at the level of detail re-
quired in other lawsuits. 'When there is a claim for limited relief, where 
relief should have been available through the courts at the time, and 
where relief would have been available had the world been even mini-
29 There are some suggestive cases in which the statute of limitations has been tolled 
over many years in certain limited and extraordinary circumstances. See, e.g., Bodner v. 
Banque Paribas, 11-1 F. SlIpp. 2d 117, 134-35 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). In cases where the plaintiffs 
could not gain effective relief, particularly when the gO\'ernment made it impossible to 
pursue the claims, some federal courts have tolled the statute of limitations. In Rosner v. 
United States, 231 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1208 (S.D. Fla. 2002), for instance, the plaintiffs alleged 
that the government mistakenly reported that gold taken from French holocaust victims 
was unidentifiable and unreturnable. The government's culpability in cases like Tulsa, 
where the courts were effectively unavailable, goes beyond the failure of the government 
to mislead owners about the identity of property. 
Alternatively, legislation might extend the statute of limitations. In Deutsch v. Turner 
CO/p., 324 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 2003), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated a Cali-
fornia statute that extended the period of limitations for victims of\Vorid \Var II-era forced 
slave labor on the grounds that the statute ran afoul of the Foreign Affairs Doctrine and 
was therefore unconstitutional. See id.; CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 354.6 (West 2003). A similar 
law focused on purely domestic slave labor might avoid such difficulties. Nevertheless, such 
legislation extending the statute of limitations against the government is unlikely in states 
where the legislature refuses to take action, as happened in Tulsa. However, state legisla-
tures may be willing to impose the liability on companies, particularly if they do most of 
their business outside the state, as was the case with the California statute that required 
insurance companies to disclose life insurance policies written by their affiliates in Europe 
from 1920 to 1945. 
For more on the unavailability of relief for Tulsa riot victims, see Alfred L. Brophy, 
Norms, Law, and Reparations: The Case of the Ku Klux Klan in 1920s Oklahoma, 19 HARV. 
BLACKLE'ITER LJ (forthcoming 2004); Alfred L. Brophy, Racial Legislation, Violence, and 
the Breakdown of Law in the Tulsa Riot Era (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
author). 
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mally fair, riot victims or victims of other Jim Crow crimes have a com-
pelling argument. 
The bases for statute of limitations defenses are under-theorized. 
Most commentators are content to say that there should be repose at 
some point so that institutions, corporations, and people can move 
forward. Repose is a relatively weak argument when weighed against 
the argument that there was never an opportunity-during the statute 
of limitations-to challenge the defendants or to hold them account-
able. 30 Statutes of limitation also preserve against the need to defend 
against stale claims, an argument that has been made recently in the 
wake of old claims being asserted in sexual abuse cases.3J A court 
weighing a statute of limitations claim may want to take account of the 
quality of evidence in deciding whether to toll. A court should con-
sider, then, a series of factors: the availability (or unavailability) of re-
lief at the time of the racial crime, the identity of the victims (and 
whether they are still alive), the identity of the defendants, the 
significance of the crime, the continuing impact of the crime on vic-
tilus, and the quality of the evidence. 
C. The Tulsa Race Riot as a Model 
One might ask, to what remedies would the Tulsa victims be enti-
tled? Each victim would receive compensation for deprivation of 
property and temporary liberty. To that extent, Tulsa is a typical civil 
rights lawsuit. Is other relief available, too, that might permit a more 
community-wide remedy? Tulsa is a strong case for reparations of 
some sort, either through the courts or through the legislature. In-
deed, four limiting factors suggest that the legislature owes Tulsa vic-
tims reparations: (1) some of the victims are still alive, (2) the Tulsa 
riot is concentrated in time and place, (3) the government sponsored 
the harm, and (4) promises were made at the time to help rebuild the 
city. Tulsa is, however, at once compelling and limiting: as we move 
30 There may, of course, be other claimants to the property, who-if we are willing to 
toll the statute of limitations-may have a superior claim to those seeking to use it for 
reparations purposes. Sec generally Ernest J. Weinrib, Restitutionary Damages as Corrective 
justice, 1 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 1 (2000) (arguing that restitution for any ~Tongful 
gain "is unsatisfactory because it fails to link the damages that the plaintiff receives to the 
normative quality of the defendant's ~ong"). 
31 See, e.g., Ralph Ranalli, Push Made to Toughen Abuse Laws: Romney, Reilly Weigh Changes, 
Bos. GI.OBE,July 26,2003, at Al (discussing a proposal to remove statutes of limitation for 
sexual abuse claims in l\hssachusetts). 
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into larger reparations programs beyond Tulsa, the case becomes 
more amorphous. 
1. Riots 
There are a series of riots for which we can use Tulsa as a model. 
One might look to the East St. Louis riot of 1917, for instance, where 
a combination of racial hatred, fueled by race-baiting politicians and 
the use of African Americans as strikebreakers in the local iron and 
meat packing plants, led the Mrican-American community to take ac-
tion to protect itself. The community armed, and, following an attack 
on the evening of July 3, some African Americans fired into an un-
marked police car, believing that it contained passengers who had 
shot into African-American homes earlier that evening. That misun-
derstanding, which left a police officer dead, led to random attacks on 
African Americans working in the white section of East St. Louis the 
next day. Throughout the morning, the attacks escalated. By the af-
ternoon, Mrican Americans were being attacked throughout the city. 
Then, the state guard, in conjunction with local police, began to in-
vade the African-American section of East St. Louis. Many members of 
the state guard stood by as the mob attacked the helpless community; 
some state guard members even joined in the attacks. 
Following the riot, a congressional investigation focused on the 
causes of the violence. It laid blame on local industry for using recent 
Mrican-American migrants from the South to keep wages low. The 
Special Committee's report concluded that: 
The strike in the plant of the Aluminum Ore Company was 
caused by a demand on the part of the organized labor for an 
adjustment of wages, a reduction in hours and an improve-
men t of conditions under which the men worked. The com-
pany refused to meet any of these demands, declined to dis-
cuss the matter with the workmen's committee, and added 
insult to injury by importing negro strike breakers and giving 
them the places of the white men . .. [T] he bringing of ne-
groes to break a strike which was being peaceably conducted 
by organized labor sowed the dragon's teeth of race hatred 
that afterwards grew into the riot which plunged East St. 
Louis into blood and flame. 32 
32 REPORT OF THE SPECIAl" COMMITTEE AUTHORIZED BY CONGRESS TO INVESTIGATE 
THE EAST ST. LOUIS RACE RIOTS, H.R. Doc. No. 65-1231, at 1, 15 (1918). Several books 
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The Special Committee report on East St. Louis taught whites an im-
portant lesson regarding how to talk about the riot-namely, as at 
least partially the fault of blacks who had armed to protect themselves. 
It also taught blacks an important lesson: do not give up your guns, 
because you will be shot anyway. After East St. Louis, riots became 
somewhat more violent because the black community was better pre-
pared to defend itself-and less likely to sit passively by as it was at-
tacked. 
The story of East St. Louis is compelling and deserves an impor-
tant monographic O-eatment. The most recent study is now nearly forty 
years 01d.33 East St. Louis presents a somewhat different case from 
Tulsa, however, because riot victims received reparations. An existing 
Illinois statute gave victims of mob ,iolence a cause of action against 
the municipality where the ,iolence occurred. The statute was in es-
sence an attempt to provide an incentive for municipalities to protect 
their citizens against mob violence; when the sheriff knew he was liable 
to victims, he would be more ,igilant in guarding against ,iolence. The 
statute was an early form of strict liability. The idea of liability without 
regard to fault, so novel in the early twentieth century, was tested in the 
Supreme Court. The Court upheld the statute.34 
provide further examples of race-related labor conflicts. See generally ERIC ARNESON, BROTH-
ERHOODS OF COLOR: BLACK RAILROAD WORKERS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (2001); 
JAMES R. GROSSMAN, LAND OF HOPE: CHICAGO, BLACK SOUTHERNERS & THE GREAT tvh-
GRATION (1989); RICK HALPERN, DOWN ON THE KILLING FLOOR: BLACK AND WHITE WORK-
ERS IN CHICAGO'S PACKINGHOUSES, 1904-54 (1997). 
33 See ELLIOTT M. RUDWICK, RACE RIOT AT EAST ST. LOUIS, JULY 2, 1917 (1964). Mr. 
Rudwick's monograph, so pioneering at the time, brought attention to the tragedy. Neverthe--
less, it is seriously outdated in its failure to provide attention to African-American culture. 
The victims of the riot appear in the monograph as little more than pawns in a historical 
tragedy; we need a study that gives the Mrican-American community more attention. How, 
one wonders, did the great ideas of the renaissance influence the community'S arming for 
self-protection? How did the great migration lead to conflict between African-American and 
white workers? How did the manufacturing and meat packing companies in East St. Louis 
manipulate racial dynamics, to set the stage for riot? Moreover, we now have much more 
sophisticated methods of interpreting the narratives told before the Congressional Commit-
tee investigating the riot and in the pages of white and black newspapers throughout the 
country than were available in Mr. Rudwick's time. There are many questions that need an-
swers and, fortunately, hundreds of pages of congressional testimony, as well as chi! and 
crinlinal lawsuits, that can help answer those questions. Finally, there is a great need for ex-
ploration of the results of the riot-essentially, how it was remembered and how that memory 
affected Chicago, Elaine, Arkansas, and Washington in 1919 and Tulsa in 1921. 
34 See City of Chicago v. Sturgis, 222 U.S. 313, 322-24 (1911) (upholding the constitu-
tionality of Illinois statute imposing liability on cities for three-quarters value of mob dam-
age regardless of fault); see also MORTON J. HOR WITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN 
LAW, 1870-1960, at 123-26 (1992) (discussing Justice Holmes's views on strict liability in 
tort law). 
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East St. Louis represents a case, then, where some victims re-
ceived reparations. The statute limited recovery, however, to family 
members of those who died. It provided nothing for those who merely 
lost property; it also failed to provide compensation to the entire 
community for its losses. As with Tulsa, there are some identifiable 
immediate victims and there is a community currently in terrible 
shape. One might seek a remedy that provides something for the vic-
thus themselves. But what of the community? The important issue is 
finding some theory for large-scale repair of the community, rather 
than merely providing money to a very limited number of now elderly 
plaintiffs. What are the theories that one might use to repair wounded 
communities? Here a class action might make sense, on behalf of 
residents of East St. Louis. The problem will be in linking relief to the 
harms caused by the riot. Unfortunately, the tragedy of East St. Louis 
is that there are so many problems that have little connection to the 
riot itself, such as willful neglect borne of decades of urban policy. 
Other riots raise similar issues. There are well-known riots, like 
those in Chicago and Washington in 1919. Those limited riots might 
provide a way of getting money into the hands of a relatively limited 
group of individuals. They may even suggest the limitations on greater 
harms. One need not move much further back in time before there 
are no survivors. Contrast, for example, the Atlanta riot of 1906 with 
East St. Louis. It is unlikely that any survivors of the Atlanta riot are 
still alive today-or if they are, they would have to be at least ninety-
seven years old. Yet the African-American community in Atlanta suf-
fered greatly during the riot and afterward. As John Godshalk has 
demonstrated, there was substantial police iIlYolvement in the riot-
and it reinforced the racial segregation of Atlanta.35 How does one re-
pair that damage? What might reparations for that riot look like, if 
there are no survivors? What present harm would we repair? The 
problems are worthy of serious consideration, but they quickly be-
come almost insurmountable. 
2. Lynchings 
One could also work in a different direction, looking toward indi-
vidual cases of lynching. What do we make of lynchings that often took 
35 John F. Godshalk, In the Wake of Riot: Atlanta's Struggle for Order, 1899-1919, at 
35-39 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, iale University) (on file with Southwest Missouri 
State University); see Dominic J. Capeci, Jr. & Jack C. Knight, Reckoning with Violence: H~E.B. 
Du Bois and the 1906 Atlanta Race Riot, 62J. S. HIST. 727, 741-46 (1996). 
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place under the supervision of local officials? For lynching cases, one 
might identify factors similar to those in Tulsa. There are several par-
ticularly well-documented cases. In Oklahoma, for instance, the attor-
ney general began investigating l)lIChing in the early 1920s. Those in-
Yestigations, though they did not result in successful prosecutions, 
provide important details about the role of government officials in the 
lynchings of Mrican Americans. In those cases, as with riots, one can 
identifY victims (the family members of lynching victims) and govern-
mental defendants. Because lynching provides a discreet event, the case 
is particularly compelling. Reparations might come in the form of 
payments to family members of the victim, or in the more general form 
of a historical truth commission that reminds us of the harm of lynch-
ing and associated Jim Crow crimes to communities. Targeting the per-
petrators oflynchings is an opportunity to use a single event as a site for 
viewing the legacy of Jim Crow and for understanding how the whole 
system of racial legislation, extralegal violence, and private discrimina-
tion functioned. 36 For many lynching victims, however, the case is not 
so easily made because there is less evidence of direct governmental 
involvement. At best, there is evidence of failure to protect the victims. 
Moreover, the statute of limitations plagues lynching lawsuits just as it 
does riot lawsuits. 
This raises critical issues of legalized lynching. What do we make 
of criminal defendants convicted of crimes on minuscule evidence, 
before politically motivated judges and prosecutors and an inflamed 
jury? One might look to cases like Moore v. Dempsey, which arose out of 
the 1919 Elaine, Arkansas massacre, for evidence of how legalized 
lynchings worked.37 Fortunately for the defendants in that case, Jus-
tice Holmes overturned the convictions of eight Mrican American 
men who had been railroaded into death sentences for their "role in 
[that] negro uprising."38 
The prosecutions of Jesse Hollins39 and the Scottsboro boys40 are 
further examples of laughably biased proceedings. It is difficult, how-
36 Sec generalZv Alfred L. Brophy. The Tulsa Race Riot Commission, Apologies, and Repara-
tions: Understanding the Functions and Limitations of a Historical Truth Commission, in APOLO-
GIES AND TRUTH COMMISSIONS (Alexander Ka.rn ed., forthcoming 2004) (discussing what 
truth commissions can accompli~h as well as their limitations); Ifill, supm note 27, at 309-
11 (discussing the roles that truth commissions for lynchings might fill). 
37 See Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 88-89 (1923). 
38 Sec id. at 91-92. 
39 See Hollins v. Oklahoma, 295 U.S. 394, 395 (1935). 
40 Sec Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 50-51 (1932). See generally DAN T. CARTER, 
SCOTrsBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH (1969) (providing a narrative account 
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ever, to contemplate how one would file lawsuits for reparations in 
those cases. Is there a possibility of suing for wrongful prosecution? 
What is the standard? What if the defendants are no longer alive? Al-
ternatively, as David Levine has suggested, one form of reparations 
might be the individualized review of Mrican Americans who were 
convicted of crimes with substandard due process protections.41 That 
might result in, at least, the return of voting rights for those wrong-
fully convicted of felonies. It might also result in compensation for 
those wrongfully convicted.42 
3. Jim Crow Legislation 
Let us move a little further away from what are rather typical civil 
rights cases. How might we conceptualize lawsuits for other Jim Crow 
legislation? Jim Crow legislation affected entire communities. In some 
communities, for instance, virtually no Mrican Americans were enti-
tled to vote. How do we take account of statutes that limited voting 
rights? There are identifiable defendants: the state legislatures that 
passed discriminatory voting legislation and the state officers charged 
with implementing the legislation. Some of the victims are still alive. 
This leaves open the problem of finding an appropriate remedy. 
Remedies for voting rights violations are notoriously difficult to de-
vise. Just after Oklahoma gained statehood, for instance, the Okla-
homa legislature passed a restrictive voter registration statute. It was 
not just the discriminatory statute, however, that kept blacks from vot-
ing. The voter registrars went beyond the statute and, in many cases, 
imposed ridiculously difficult literacy tests. In Guinn v. United States, 
the Eigth Circuit Court of Appeals discussed several outrageous deni-
als of voting rights.43 In one instance, J. Hilyard, the principal of the 
Cimarron Industrial Institute, who had graduated from Alcorn A&M 
College in Mississippi, Lincoln University of Pennsylvania, and the 
Bryant & Stratton Institute in Buffalo, New York, was prevented from 
voting. As the court concluded, "There is not the slightest room for 
of the Scottsboro case, addressing such issues as racism, radicalism, and the southern judi-
cial system); JAMES E. GOODMAN, STORIES OF SCOTTSBORO (1994) (telling the story of 
Scottsboro and addressing controversial issues ignored by past authors). 
41 Email from David I. Levine, Professor of Law, University of California at Hastings 
College of Law, to Alfred L. Brophy, Professor of Law, University of Alabama (Oct. 31, 
2003, 16:29 EST & 16:53 EST) (on file with author). 
42 See Alberto B. Lopez, $10 and a Denim Jacket? A lI1.odel Statute for Compensating the 
Wrongly Convicted, 36 GA. L. REV. 665,721-22 (2002). 
43 Guinn v. United States, 228 F. 103, 109-10 (8th Cir. 1915). 
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doubt as to whether he could vote .... There seems no room for 
doubt that the defendants knew that fact."44 In other instances, blacks 
who were entitled to vote because their ancestors had been entitled to 
vote were denied their rights.45 In some instances, there were no liter-
acy tests administered; African Americans were simply turned away.46 
When the Supreme Court struck down Oklahoma's grandfather 
clause-which denied voting rights for all who could not read except 
for those people (and their descendants) who had been allowed to 
vote prior to 1866-in Guinn v. Oklahoma in 1915, it provided only a 
limited remedy: it struck down the statute.47 The Oklahoma legisla-
ture subsequently re-passed the voter registration statute, which again 
limited the right to register. That statute was struck down, too, in the 
1930s. 
What is the harm? One would have to show that voting would 
have made a difference, as well as the type of difference it would have 
made, which is a difficult task.48 The entire community suffered a 
harm that may be compensable in some way,49 but this begins to look 
like a claim for general societal discrimination, which is unlikely to 
succeed.50 Recalling that racially neutral statutes can have discrimina-
tory effects might provide an important contribution, but over-
reliance on this legal principle might be at odds with the requirement 
44 [d. at 109. 
45 See id. at 109-10. 
46 See id. at 110. 
47 See Guinn v. Oklahoma, 238 V.S. 347, 363-64 (1915). 
48 See Michael]. Klarman, Race and the Court in the PlVgressive Era, 51 VAND. L. REV. 881, 
914-15 (1998); Peyton McCrary, Bringing Equality to Power: How the Federal Courts Trans-
formed the Electoral Structure of Southern Politics, 1960-1990,5 V. PA.]. CONST. L. 665, 669-70 
(2003); Mark V. Tushnet, Prog7"t!ssive Era Race Relations Cases in their "Traditional" Context, 51 
VAND. L. REV. 993, 996-97 (1998). 
49 In some cases, the mere deprivation of a constitutional right-even if there is no 
harm-may be compensable. See, e.g., Carey v. Piphus, 435 V.S. 247, 266 (1978). Or in 
some cases there may be injunctive relief to re-vote, even if there is little evidence that the 
vote will come out differently. See Bell v. Southwell, 376 F.2d 659. 664-65 (5th Cir. 1967). 
The latter remedy is obviously ineffective unless the election misbehavior occured recently. 
50 See City of Richmond v.].A. Croson, Co., 488 V.S. 469, 498 (1989) (requiring more 
than a "generalized assertion that there has been past discrimination in an entire indus-
try"); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 V.S. 267, 276 (1986) ("Societal discrimination, 
without more, is too amorphous a basis for imposing a racially classified remedy."). 
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of Washington v. Davis 51 that Equal Protection challenges to facially-
neutral statutes have to show discriminatory motive.52 
Perhaps lawsuits against the counties and municipalities that lim-
ited funding to segregated schools might fare better. There are 
identifiable victims-all the school-aged children in an entire commu-
nity who suffered the harm. There are also identifiable governmental 
actors-the bodies that provided different (and very frequently inade-
quate) funding to African-American schools. Would a class action re-
cover for the lost educational value? Even determining damages would 
be difficult. How much did poor schooling limit students' later job 
prospects? The problem is that even well-educated Mrican Americans 
faced poor job prospects during the Jim Crow era. Might there be a 
more limited recovery for negative unjust enrichment for the value of 
money saved by under-funding segregated schools? Such recovery 
would grossly underestimate the harm, but it might avoid other proof 
problems of linking education to later income. Some of these problems 
were worked out in the years after Brown v. Board of Education,53 when 
plaintiffs sought relief for segregated schools. It may be hard to go back 
now and ask for additional relief-even though the potential plaintiffs 
are different. At any rate, these lawsuits merit substantial consideration. 
Other segregation statutes-like those that segregated libraries, or 
that kept people segregated on railroads and on street cars, or that lim-
ited where people might live-also merit consideration. The library 
statute poses a particularly intriguing problem. The sadness of segre-
51 426 U.S. 229, 239-45 (1976) (holding that a law is not unconstitutional solely be-
cause it has a racLc,lly disproportionate impact, regardless of whether it reflects a racblly 
discriminatory purpose). 
52 Obviously, the discriminatory motive was demonstrated in the legislation struck 
down in Guinn. See 238 U.S. at 363-64. Nevertheless, we might learn from the history of 
voting rights discrimination that we need to be especblly vigilant in the protection of vot-
ing rights. See Kim Forde-Mazrui, The Constitutionallmplicatiolls of Race-Neutral Affirmative 
Action, 88 GEO. LJ. 2331, 2346 n.70 (2000) (discussing voting rights). The Voting Rights 
Act of 1965 ought, in that case, to be considered a key piece of reparations legislation, for 
it was based so fully on the history of discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (Supp. 1982); see 
H.R. REP. No. 89-439, at 21-22 (1965), rep/in ted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2437, 2445-44. In-
deed, the Supreme Court has recently re-acknowledged the role of history in supporting 
the constitutionality of the Act. See Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 373 (2001) 
("Congress documented a marked pattern of unconstitutional action by the States. State 
officbls, Congress found, routinely applied voting tests in order to exclude Mrican-
American citizens from registering to vote. Congress also determined that litigation had 
proved ineffective and that there persisted an otherwise inexplicable 50-percentage-point 
gap in the registration of white and Mrican-American voters in some States.") (citation 
omitted). 
53 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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gated libraries precisely suggests the insidious nature of Jim Crow: 
white Americans decided that they would even attempt to limit access 
to knowledge. Although people like Ralph Ellison demonstrate that it 
was possible to overcome those barriers (his mother brought home 
magazines for him to read, which she collected from the white homes 
where she worked as a maid), the barriers to education were impos-
ing.54 
Who could sue for unavailability of libraries? One supposes every 
African American who lived in a municipality where there were no 
accessible libraries might have a cause of action. The remedy cries out 
for some kind of injunctive relief, akin to desegregation of schools, 
with increased library facilities in the community in which the dis-
crimination took place. Drawing upon Patterson Toby Graham's im-
portant book on segregated libraries in Alabama, which demonstrates 
the ways that libraries were segregated by law,55 one might construct 
an argument along these lines: as a result of governmental decisions, 
blacks had fewer opportunities to access public libraries in the state of 
Alabama than did whites. 56 The harm was a decrease in educational 
opportunities at the time-and decades later, such harm is extremely 
difficult to calculate or compensate. Present decisions regarding li-
brary locations, however, could be a valuable means of remedying for 
past harm. The magnificent, once all-white central library in Bir-
mingham, for instance, could have been located somewhere else; 
similarly, decisions about collection development, which continue to 
have effect to this day, might be shown to have been racially moti-
vated. Future decisions about library location and collection devel-
54 See Arthur LeFrancois, Our Chosen Frequency: Norms, Race, and Transcendence in Ralph 
Ellison s Cadillac Flambe, 26 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 1021, 1022 (2001) (discussing Ellison's 
experience with a segregated library in Oklahoma City). See generally PATTERSON TOBY 
GRAHAM, A RIGHT TO READ: SEGREGATION AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN ALABAMA'S PUBLIC LI-
BRARIES 1900-65 (2002) (discussing segregation in Alabama's libraries). 
55 See generally GRAHAM, supm note 54. 
56 Although one might expect that in an area like libraries, whose sole function is to 
provide education (and therefore educational, social, moral, and economic growth), the 
forces supporting improvement for all would suppress tendencies toward racial exclusion, 
libraries were hotly contested sites of integration. See, e.g., Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library 
of Baltimore City, 149 F.2d 212, 213 (4th Cir. 1945) (showing discrimination in providing 
training for library workers); Hainsworth v. Harris County Comm'rs' Court, 265 S.W.2d 
217,218 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) (refusing relief from allegation that county law library was 
segregated). Perhaps because of the symbolic value of libraries, they became an importan t 
site for sit-ins during the Civil Rights movement. See generally Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 
131 (1966) (reversing convictions of African Americans who conducted a sit-in at a public 
library). 
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opment may be excellent subjects for injunctive relief.57 Moreover, the 
redirection of library funds to promote education has important sym-
bolic value. Indeed, it is difficult to think of a project better de-
signed-at least symbolically-to repair both for past Jim Crow dis-
crimination in education and to make a statement about the future. 58 
In selecting targets of a Jim Crow lawsuit, one must ask, what do 
we want to accomplish? Partly, we want to tell a story about the past, to 
educate ourselves and others about the role that Jim Crow played in 
the lives of Mrican Americans, and others, too. Then we ought to try 
to repair the lives of those who suffered discrimination. That requires 
locating cases in which we can overcome statute of limitations de-
fenses, as well as locate substantive bases for recovery. At the same 
time, we should look for areas where there may be some community-
wide relief, which might be forward-looking. Victories on those issues 
might then be tied together with legislative reparations, which are not 
so bounded by the requirements of lawsuits. 
The remedy must take into account the entire history of Jim 
Crow-a system that used extralegal violence and legislation to limit 
educational and voting opportunities, which ultimately limited oppor-
tunities for Mrican Americans and allowed whites to use their labor at 
below what its cost otherwise would have been. A remedy for such a 
widespread harm becomes difficult to contemplate because it is 
difficult to show how much loss any particular harm caused. How does 
57 There is some record of court-directed collection development. See Taylor v. Perini, 
421 F. Supp. 740, 749-54 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (listing more than 100 books on black experi-
ence to be added to a prison library). 
58 As long as we are thinking about lawsuits for segregated facilities, one might con-
sider segregated parks and swimming pools. See, e.g., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 
228 (1971) (upholding Jackson, Mississippi's dosing of public swimming pools instead of 
integrating them). The problems with those suits is that the behavior was legal at the tinIe. 
If the behavior was legal, it becomes difficult to find a cause of action. How do we go back 
and impose liability on the city of Jackson-where, because of changing demographics, 
70.6% of the city was black in 2000? See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2000 CENSUS OF POPULATION 
AND HOUSING: MISSISSIPPI SUMMARY POPULATION AND HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS 74, 
tbl.4 (2003), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2000/phc-1-26.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 26, 2003). This is a strange phenomenon, whereby the current taxpayers, who are 
descended from the people who were discriminated against (and some of whom were vic-
tims themselves), are being asked to pay reparations to themselves. They are asked to pay 
for decisions that were legal at the time-and presumably still are legal. 
The case works much better when the Jim Crow discrimination was illegal at the 
time-or at least questionable-and was subsequently prohibited. It also works better in 
cases where there is a continuing effect (as in library collections or location) of past illegal 
conduct. 
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one measure the damage of a failure to obtain an adequate secondary 
school education? 
There is no question that there has been damage, but attributing it 
to particular individuals, businesses, or entities is difficult. This is one of 
the reasons attempts at remedies for general societal discrimination 
have become so popular. Yet constructing a remedy through a lawsuit, 
even using tort as a model, involves problematic issues of proof. One is 
then left with thinking about three types of recoveries: (1) disgorge-
ment of benefits retained by the community, (2) recovery in which 
specific proof of loss is provable, and (3) recovery where community-
based relief is appropriate. In each case, the problems with proof of loss 
are reduced. Each of those models can be applied to Jim Crow crimes. 
II. FRAMING THE ISSUES IN TORT LAW AND REPARATIONS FOR SLAVERY 
Legal scholars have begun to take seriously the possibility of law-
suits for slavery-and they have begun to assess some of the problems 
with such suits. Professor Hylton's provocative paper, "Slavery and 
Tort Law, "59 identifies three major problem areas with the use of tort 
law as a vehicle for reparations for slavery. First, tort law cannot pro-
vide compensation for the worst evils of slavery-what Hylton calls 
social torts, such as the destruction of family life, or the destruction of 
slaves' religious beliefs. Second, derivative claims (claims of descen-
dants) are too remote to serve as the basis for reparations. Finally, the 
cultural war over reparations suggests that we should have an account-
ing of the benefits from slavery and then allow the community to 
gauge for itself what to do about past injustice. 
Tort law can provide two separate ways of approaching repara-
tions claims. First, one might try to use tort law as a means of obtain-
ing limited reparations. That is, one could file a lawsuit and use tort as 
the substantive basis for recovery.60 There are some high hurdles to 
overcome in such a suit: statute of limitations, sovereign immunity, 
identification of victims, identification of plaintiffs, causation, and 
measurement of harm. Second, and more broadly, tort law might pro-
vide a basis for apportioning moral culpability. Instead of thinking 
about only a lawsuit, one might employ the well-developed principles 
59 KEITH N. HYLTON, SLAVERY AND TORT LAW 2-4 (Boston Univ. Sch. of Law, Working 
Paper No. 03-02, 2003 Soc. Science Research Network Elec. Paper Collection), at http:/ / 
www.bu.edu/law/faculty/papers/pdUiles/HyltonK012803.pdf (last visited Nov. 9,2003). 
60 Reparations claims are often phrased as lawsuits. See ARTHUR SEROTA, ENDING 
APARTHEID IN AMERICA: THE NEED FOR A BLACK POLITICAL PARTY AND REPARATIONS Now 
137-42 (1996) (explaining reparations using the example of a personal injury lawsuit). 
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that jurists have developed as a framework for understanding the 
harm of slavery and its effects on the current generation. That 
framework might be used for two larger purposes: to educate the pub-
lic about the effects of slavery, and to construct a program of legisla-
tive reparations. The following section addresses both Professor Hyl-
ton's critique of tort law as a basis for recovery and the ways that tort 
law might be stretched to provide for reparations tor slavery-either 
through the courts or through a legislature. 
A. The Problems ofA.melican Law's Liberalism 
[jjllst as a court's power to correct injustice is derived from the law, a 
COli rt's power is circu IIlsClibed by the law as well. 
-Cruz v. United States 61 
An important part of the difficulty with using tort law as an anal-
ogy is that it simply is not well-designed to address questions of group 
harm. In the nineteenth century-indeed, until well into the twenti-
eth century-lawsuits provided only very limited relief. They estab-
lished the rights of individual parties when there were well-established 
rights.62 Sometimes the legal system acljudicated rights of major seg-
ments of the population-such as the rights of states, as happened in 
Dred Scott v. Sandford.53 Within the slave system, lawsuits typically ad-
justed rights between owners and their overseers, or hirers of their 
slaves, or, less frequently, with people who interfered with the slave 
relationship. The legal system enforced norms of obedience to orders 
of owners and overseers through criminal prosecution of slaves or 
through the failure to criminally prosecute those who abused slaves. 
There are cases that protected the master's rights when borrowers of 
slaves misused them. Similarly, there are cases that protected the mas-
61 219 F. Supp. 1027, 1046 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 
62 See WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE LEGALIST REFORMATION: LAW, POLITICS, AND IDEOL-
OGY IN NEW YORK, 1920-1980, at 1 (2001) (analyzing courts as a way of integrating-and 
controlling-inter-group conflict). See generally EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., LITIGATION AND 
INEQUALITY: FEDERAL DIVERSITY JURISDICTION IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, 1870-1958 (1992) 
(discussing caseload of federal district courts and the distinct types and uses of litigation). 
Nelson suggests that courts were the vehicle for integrating the diverse New lurk commu-
nities. NELSON, supra, at 1. 
63 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857); see Alfred L. Brophy, Let Us Go 
Back and Stand Upon tlte Constitution: Federal-State Relations in Scott v. Sandford, 90 COLUM. 
L. REV. 192, 193 (1990) (discussing the implications of Dred Scott for rights of states in areas 
such as taxation and slavery). l\Iost frequently, however, the common law protected narrow 
claims. [0] 
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ter's property rights when slaves were injured. Those who abused 
slaves in their custody might haw been liable to the slaves' owners for 
harm to the slaw, but they were not criminally liable. "From the great 
institutions in society," as Harriet Beecher Stowe once said, "no help 
whatever is to be expected. "64 
The legislative system might confer rights on individuals, as 
through pensions to war veterans and their families. 65 Nevertheless, 
there was little opportunity-or desire-for individuals to use the le-
gal process to overcome inequality during slavery and Jim Crow. In-
deed, to the extent that anyone thought about these issues at the 
time, they recognized that the legal system primarily served property 
interests.66 In recent years, there have been several heavily criticized 
64 Alfred L. Brophy, Humanity. Utility, and Logic in Southern Legal Thought: Harriet Beecher 
Stowe's Vision in Dred: A Tale of the Great Dismal Swamp. 78 B.U. L. REV. 1113. 1150 n.143 
(1998) (quoting 2 HARRIET BEECHER STOWE, DRED: A TALE m" THE GREAT DISMAL SWAMP 
76 (1856». 
65 See Christine A. Desan. The Constitutiollal Commitment to Legislative Adjudication in the 
Early American Tradition, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1382, 1421-23 (1998) (discussing the petition-
ing by soldiers to the New 'tark legislature for reimbursement of expenses and the gOY-
ernmen t's acquiescence in the form of a pension). Pensions haye historically been an im-
portant part of American social welfare policy. Indeed, Theda Skocpol has suggested that 
they were the major source of social welfare before the New Deal, and that they served as a 
model for other social welfare programs. See THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND 
!\[OTIIERS: TIlE POLITICAL ORIGINS Of SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 7-11 (1992). 
See generally LAURA JENSEN, PATRIOTS, SETTLERS, AND THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL 
POLICY (2003) (interpreting pensions and land grants as part of early American origins of 
entitlement); ELIZABETH REGOSIN, FREEDOM'S PROMISE: EX-SLAVE FAMILIES AND CITIZEN-
SIIIP IN THE AGE OF EMANCIPATION (2002) (discussing Ciyj] War pensions for African 
Americans). 
66 One might look in particular to "the outsiders"-the people left without the protec-
tion of the antebellum legal system-to understand its reverence for property rights. See 
H'hat Is the Reason? How Much Land and Property and I Havc NOIIC!, 16 U.S. MAG. & DEMO. 
REV. 17, 18 (1845), at http://cdl.library.comell.edu/cgibin/moa/pageviewer?coll=moa 
&root= moa/usde/usde0016/&tif= 0025.TIF&view= 50&frames = 1 (last visited Oct. 16, 
2003). But one can also gain a picture of its reverence from leading periodicals. See gcne)' 
ally The Commoll Law, 19 N. AM. RE\,. 411 (1824) (discllssing the veneration and obedience 
paid to authority and precedent in law). Another often-overlooked indicium of the rever-
ence of the age (and particularly jurists) for order through law comes from college lec-
tures. Sec William Gaston, An Address Deliyered Before the American Whig and Cliosophic 
Societies of the College of New Jersey 31 (Sept. 29, 1835) (discussing the importance of 
law in the protection of freedom); 'Villiam Greene, Some of the Difficulties in the Admini-
stration of a Free Government: A Discourse, Pronounced Before the Rhode Island Alpha 
of the Phi Beta Kappa Society (July 8. 1851), il1 Alfred L. Brophy, The Rule of Law in 
Antebellum College Literm7 Addresses: The Case of William Greene, 31 CU~IB. L. REV. 231, 261 
app. (2001) (discussing the dut\' of a citizen to sllStain the law while it exists, no matter 
how wrong he finds it); Daniel Lord, On the Extra-Professional Influence of the Pulpit and 
the Bar: An Oration Delivered at New Haven, Before the Phi Beta Kappa Society of 'tale 
College (July 30, 1851) (saying that the highest triumph of jurisprudence has been the 
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attempts to reinterpret antebellum legal thought as designed to pro-
tect the poor-what some might call "little people. "67 Yet even the 
most aggressive of those interpretations does not begin to move us 
away from a model of the liberal judicial mind, which has historically 
found the protection of property at its center.68 
1. Past Cases 
In the twentieth century, civil rights litigation and complex civil 
litigation have stretched the boundaries of how courts might be used. 
Structural injunctions have reordered prisons and school systems, to 
the point where we might now expect to fit a wholesale reordering of 
Anlerican society into a lawsuit.69 Reparations suits offer the promise 
of repairing the damage to particular plaintiffs who can show some 
kind of particularized harm. But that may be precisely the problem: it 
is enormously difficult to show particularized harm, at least with the 
application of old principles, not the invention of new ones), at 
http://www.law.ua.edu/ directory Ibio/abrophy IBrophy_Lord %201851.html (last visited 
Nov. 12, 2003); Timothy Walker, The Reform Spirit of the Day: An Oration Before the Phi 
Beta Kappa Society of Harvard University (july 18, 1850) (addressing the spirit of reform 
and its use for improving society), at http://www.law.ua.edu/directorY/bio/abrophy/ 
walker.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2003). 
67 The most vigorous interpretation is PETER KARSTEN, HEART VERSUS HEAD: JUDGE-
MADE LAW IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 4-5 (1997). For critical responses, see Al-
fred L. Brophy, Reason and Sentiment: The Moml Worlds and jI.Jodes of Reasoning of A.ntebellwll 
Jll/ists, 79 B.U. L. REV. 1161 (1999); La\ITence 1\1. Friedman, Losing One's Head: Judges and 
the Law in Nineteenth-Century American Legal History, 24 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 253 (1999). 
68 The recent scholarship that has refocused our attention on the ways that the com-
munity regulates property, such as Professor Novak's People'S Hblare, does little to alter our 
understanding that American law-particularly the common law-had as its primary goal 
the protection of property, not its redistribution. See WILLIAM NOVAK, PEOPLE'S WELFARE 
(1996); see also JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN Of' EVERY Onn:R RIGHT: A CONSTITU-
TIONAL HISTORY OF' PROPRTY RIGHTS 59-81 (1992) (discussing property rights in the an-
tebellum era); Alfred L. Brophy, The Intersection of Property and Slavery in Southern 
Legal Thought: From Missouri Compromise Through Civil War (2001) (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University) (on file with University of North Carolina, Chapel 
Hill Library) (discussing reverence for property and the judiciary's protection of property 
in the old South). vVhile it is certainly appropriate to focus on the ways that legal doctrine 
protected the community in the antebellum era, the dominant interpretation continues to 
be of the ways that legal doctrine promoted economic growth. &e MORTON J. HORWITZ, 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF' AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 63-108 (1977). 
69 See generally DAVISON M. DOUGLAS, READING, WRITING AND RACE: THE DESEGREGA-
TION OF THE CHARLOTTE SCHOOLS (1995) (examining the legal effort to integrate the 
Charlotte schools); LARRY W. YACKLE, REFORM AND REGRET: THE STORY OF FEDERAL JUDI-
CIAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE ALABAMA PRISON SYSTEM (1989) (explaining the implications 
of prison reform in Alabama's penal institutions). 
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degree of precision that the Supreme Court currently demands. 70 In 
addition, hurdles like sovereign immunity and statutes of limitation 
plague many cases. Moreover, there is often a lack of a substantive ba-
sis for recovery. 
The near-term history of reparations damages claims suggests that 
such claims are often unsuccessful in the court system. Beginning with 
the suit filed by Japanese Americans interned during World "\IVar II in 
the 1980s,71 running through the recen t claims by American soldiers 
who were forced to work as slave laborers by the Japanese military dur-
ing World "\IVar II, such claims have been remarkably unsuccessful. 72 
'While there have been several notable successes, most often the suc-
cesses involve a favorable ruling on a motion that keeps cases alh'e long 
enough for a settlemen t. 73 The more common result is dismissal. 74 As 
recently as the summer of 2003, the Supreme Court declared unconsti-
tutional a California law that required insurance companies to disclose 
their connections (and those of affiliated companies) to insurance 
policies sold in Europe from 1920 to 1945.75 The statute was a prelimi-
nary legislative attempt to discover the connections between insurance 
companies and policies that were taken by the Nazis.76 The president's 
foreign affairs power, however, preempted the act. The decision, there-
70 See Milliken Y. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280 (1977) (saying that remedial action "must 
be designed as nearly as possible 'to restore the victims of discriminatory conduct to the 
position they would have occupied in the absence of such conduct"'). 
71 See Hohri v. United States, 586 F. Supp. 769 (D.C. 1984), aiI'd, 847 F.2d 779 (Fed. 
Cir. 1988). Even after the Civil Liberties Act of 1988 provided compensation for Japanese 
Americans interned during World War II, some of those interned could not recover. See 
Higashi v. United States, 225 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (denying claim of daughter 
of individuals interned during World War II); Kanemoto v. Reno, 41 F.3d 641, 647 (Fed. 
Cir. 1994) (transferring claim of person who was forcibly relocated to Japan as part of 
"prisoner" exchange to Court of Claims); Jacobs v. Barr, 959 F.2d 313, 321-22 (D.C. Cir. 
1992) (denying claim of German American interned during World War II). But sec Mochi-
ZlIki v. United States, 43 Fed. Cl. 97, 98 (1999) (approving class action settlement for Japa-
nese people living in Latin America who were interned during \Vorld 'Var II). 
72 See Deutsch v. Turner Corp., 324 F.3d 692, 697 (9th Cir. 2003), modifying 317 F.3d 
1005, 1010 (9th Cir. 2003) (dismissing claim as barred by treaty ending World War II). 
73 Sec Abrams v. Societe Nationale des Chemins de Fer Francais, 332 F.3d 173, 176 (2d 
Cir.2003) (vacating the district court's grant of defendant's motion to dismiss); In re Holo-
caust Victim Assets Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 139, 141 (E.D.N.r: 2000) (approving settlement 
of $1.25 billion of claims arising from assets retained by Swiss banks in aftermath of World 
"'ar II). 
74 See Sampson v. Federal Republic of Germany, 250 F.3d 1145, 1146 (7th Cir. 2001); 
Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1994); In rc Nazi Era 
Cases Against German Defendants Litig., 129 F. Supp. 2d 370, 389-90 (D.NJ. 2001). 
75 See Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 123 S. Ct. 2374, 2379 (Supp. 2003). 
76 Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act of 1999, CAL. INS. CODE §§ 13800-13807 
(Stipp. 2003). 
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fore, has little bearing on statutes that require U.S. companies to dis-
close their dealings with slavery.77 
There is a developing body of cases holding companies and or-
ganizations liable for their role in contemporary human rights crimes,78 
For purposes of considering Mrican-American reparations for Jim Crow 
and slavery, it is best to consider those as involving issues so distinct that 
they are not relevant here. 
2. Goals of Reparations 
Most people who talk about reparations as a serious goal envision 
a wholesale reordering of American society. Their agenda includes 
redistribution of wealth and a breakdown of racism and white privi-
lege. How the latter goals will be accomplished is rarely specified. In-
deed, a critical problem with reparations is that reparationists have 
not yet specified what they want. 79 It is exceedingly difficult to get 
somewhere until you know where it is you are going. Put another way, 
as Arthur Serota has phrased the problem, "Revolutions cannot work 
without a realistic finance plan. "80 Professor Munford in Race and 
Reparations said that we should "demand it all! "81 
77 See id. § 13812. See generally V. Dion Haynes. Report Names Slaves, Owners and Insurers, 
CHI. TRIB., l\1ay 2, 2002, § 1, at 1 (discussing California's report on insurance companies 
that insured slaves and lawsuits seeking reparations from those companies); L.A.. Council 
Moves Toward Slavery Law, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., June 21, 2003, at A6 (discussing city 
ordinances that require disclosure of corporations' connections with slayery). The Cali-
fornia law has resulted in a registry of names of insurance companies that wrote policies, 
as well as the names of people whose slayes were insured. CAL. DEP'T OF INS., SLAVERY ERA 
INS. REGISTRY BY NAME OF SLAVEHOLDER (2002). at http://www.insurance.ca.gov/SEIR/ 
main.htm (last modified July 26,2002). 
78 See Lisa Girion, 1789 Law .4cquires Human Rights Role, L.A. TIMES, June 16, 2003, at 1 
(discussing increased efforts by plaintiffs to hold corporations liable for their human rights 
abuses in the developing world, including a pending case against California-based Unocal 
Corporation before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals). 
79 See Calvin Massey, Some TllOlIgts on the Law and Politics of Reparations for SlavelY, 24 B.C. 
THIRD WORLD L:J. 157 (2004) (listing problems with reparations and asking questions 
about implementation); Peter Schuck, Slavery Reparations: A. Misguided AJovement, JURIST, 
Dec. 9, 2002 (listing questions in implementation, which must be answered in order to 
determine the content of reparations programs), at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/ 
forumnew78.php (last visited Nov. 12, 2003). 
so SEROTA, supra note 60, at 147. 
8\ MUNFORD, supra note 14, at 413. Munford continues: 
Insist on collecting everything owing to us as a people historically, down to 
the last penny, and not one whit less. Make indemnification item number one 
on the Black political signboard. We need to calculate the gigantic debt owed 
the African creators of the wealth luxuriated in by the white industrialized 
North and once that is done, get right down to negotiating the forms, ac-
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Some sense of what reparationists want may be gained by looking 
more generally towards critical race scholarship. One key tenet is white 
privilege.82 The breakdown of white privilege entails a whole host of 
other assumptions, probably including the redistribution of property, 
so that it is distributed equally on a per capita basis among racial 
groups. Or, as Professor Bradford has recently summarized, the opposi-
tion to reparations comes in large part because it is about breaking 
down privilege: 
More than any other remedy, reparations transforms the ma-
terial condition of recipients. Moreover, it connotes culpabil-
ity: for a majority that rejects group hierarchy, harm, and re-
sponsibility, reparations is a radical redistribution of wealth, 
rather than a disgorgement and reallocation of an unjust ac-
quisition, that exacerbates unrest. Reparations thus yields re-
sistance, backlash, and "ethnic elbowing." As it would strip 
their racial privileges along with their currency, reparations 
is opposed by all but the most altruistic whites.83 
There is, I suspect, a considerable debate that has yet to take 
place on the value of white privilege. What does white privilege mean? 
crued interests and period of amortization. A~ Manning Marable observes, 
public policy toward Afro-Americans has been up in the air ever since deseg-
regation was legally won 30 years ago and more. Reparations-and its Siamese 
twin, Black empowerment-are imperative if the end of formal segregation is 
ever to amount to anything but a sham leading absolutely nowhere. 
Id. at 413-14 (citation omitted). 
82 See Erin E. Byrnes, Unmasking White Privilege to Expose the Fallacy of White Innocence: Us-
ing a Theory of Moral Correlativity to Make tlte Case for Affirmative Action Programs in Education, 
41 ARIZ. L. REV. 535, 554 (1999) ("Unmasking the operation of white privilege is essential 
to the goal of reaching equality under modern theories of affirmative action."); Cheryl 
Harris, Whiteness as ProperfcY, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1721 (1993) ("White identity and 
whiteness were sources of privilege and protection; their absence meant being the object 
of property."); John A. Powell, Whites Will Be Whites: The Failure to Interrogate Racial Privilege, 
34 U .S.F. L. REV. 419, 422-27 (2000) (reviewing the "negative" nature and function of 
white racial privilege). See generally PAULA S. ROTHENBERG, WHITE PRIVILEGE: ESSENTIAL 
READINGS ON THE OTHER SIDE OF R<\CISM (2002) (compiling essays and articles that exam-
ine the nature of white privilege and that suggest ways to use that privilege as a weapon 
against racism); STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN, PRIVILEGE REVEALED: How INVISIBLE PREFERENCE 
UNDERMINES AMERICA (1996) (describing the reinforcing effect of white privilege on "the 
existing racial status quo"). 
83 William Bradford, "With a lery Great Blame on Our Hearts": Reparations, Reconciliation, 
and an AmeJicall Indian Plea for Peace with justice, 27 AM. INDIAN L. REV. I, 99-100 (2002-
2003) (citations omitted). 
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How is it measured?84 What is the value of the privilege for white peo-
ple living in poverty, who have no college education, or who are above 
the poverty line, but are trapped in low-paying jobs? One wonders 
what privilege is possessed by the 10.2% of white Americans living in 
poverty.85 
Reparationists, however, have a somewhat different and wider goal 
than simply addressing white privilege: the redistribution of wealth and 
political power.86 Several articles in Professor Winbush's Should A.meJica 
Pay? provide a general game plan.87 Professor Westley's article in the 
84 See generally KIRBY l\Joss, THE COLOR OF CLASS: POOR WHITES AND THE PARADOX OF 
PRIVILEGE (2003) (challenging the assumptions of racial privilege associated with certain 
categories of color and class); STEPHEN THERNSTROM & ABIGAIL TIHRNSTROM, AMERICA 
IN BLACK AND WHITE (1997) (providing a framework for the debate on race and racism in 
America). 
85 See BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR & JOSEPH DALAKER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POVERTY IN 
THE UNITED STATES 2 tbl.1 (2003), available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty 
02.html (last visited Nov. 18,2003). 
86 Recen tly, Christian Sundquist has criticized reparations for aiming too narrowly and 
failing to attack white privilege. Christian Sundquist, Critical Praxis, Spilit Healing, and 
Community Activism: Preserving a Subversive Dialogue on Reparations, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. 
L. 659, 661-62 (2003) ("Current models of reparations present a narrow understanding of 
the 'debt' owed, limit the potential of spirit-healing within the Black community, do not 
seek to undermine privilege, and promote white backlash and intra-community divisive-
ness.") (citation omitted). I am not quite sure what scholarship Mr. Sundquist has in mind. 
To my reading, Randall Robinson's The Debt is largely about redistribution of property and, 
hence, white privilege. See generally RANDALL ROBINSON, THE DEBT: WHAT AMERICA OWES 
TO BLACKS (2000). Nevertheless, the differences between the demands of reparations ac-
tivists and critical race theorists certainly warrant attention. See generally ERIC YAMAMOTO, 
INTERRACIAL JUSTICE, supra note 3 (advancing goals of interracial justice and peace); An-
thony E. Cook, King and the Beloved Community: A. Communitanart Defense of Black Reparations, 
68 GEO. WASIL L. REV. 959 (2000) (emphasizing redistribution of privilege); Matsuda, 
supra note 2 (advancing the goal of corrective justice); jerome McCristal Culp, To the BOlle: 
Race and White Privilege, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1637 (1999) (also emphasizing redistribution of 
privilege); Roy Brooks, Slave-Redress Litigation in the United States (june 14, 2003) (un-
published manuscript on file with author) (advancing a mixture of distributive and correc-
tive justice). Such a comparison suggests the differences in reparationists' goals-in terracial 
justice and peace (in Yamamoto's case), corrective justice in Matsuda's, and a mixture of 
distributive and corrective justice in Brooks's case, and more of an emphasis on redistribu-
tion of privilege in Cook's and Culp's case. It is becoming difficult to answer the question, 
-''Vhat do reparationists want?" because they have so many different-and perhaps even 
contradictory-goals. 
87 One of the surprising elements is that even in the most recent major book on this 
topic, we have hundreds of pages of discussion on whether the United States government 
and corporations should pay reparations. But there is very little discllssion on what they 
would pay, if they were going to do so. See genemlly SHOULD AMERICA PAY?, supra note 6 
(providing comprehensive view of reparations history, legal issues, and various opinions); 
WHEN SORRY ISN'T ENOUGH: THE CONTROVERSY OVER ApOLOGIES AND REPARATIONS FOR 
HUMAN INJUSTICE (Roy L. Brooks, ed., 1999) (compiling essays on redress for human injus-
tice) . 
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Boston College Third World Law Journal establishes a general goal: aiding 
blacks as a group.88 He sees distinct advanL:'lges to group-focused reme-
dies: the payment of group reparations would create the need and the 
opportunity for institution-building that individual compensation 
would not. Additionally, beyond any perceived or real need for blacks 
to participate more fully in the consumer market, which is the inevita-
ble outcome of reparations to individuals, there is a more exigent need 
for blacks to exercise greater control over their productive labor, which 
is a possibility created by group reparations.89 Even though there will 
not be payments to individuals, Westley sees money as the central ele-
ment of a reparations plan because of its symbolic importance and be-
cause freedom in America means "economic freedom and security." 
Compensation to Blacks for the injustices suffered by them 
must first and foremost be monetary. It must be sufficient to 
indicate that the United States truly wishes to make Blacks 
whole for the losses they have endured. Sufficient, in other 
words, to reflect not only the extent of unjust Black suffer-
ing, but also the need for Black economic independence 
from societal discrimination. No less than with the freed-
men, freedom for Black people today means economic free-
dom and security. A basis for that freedom and security can 
be assured through group reparations in the form of mone-
tary compensation, along with free provision of goods and 
services to Black communities across the nation. The guid-
ing principle of reparations must be self-determination in 
every sphere of life in which Blacks are currently depend-
ent.90 
Westley proposes a private trust, with blacks as beneficiaries. The 
beneficiaries, who would also have power of appointment over the 
88 See Westley, supra note 2, at 468 ("Because it is my belief that Blacks have been and 
are harmed as a group, that racism is a group practice, I am opposed to individual repara-
tions as a primary policy objective."). 
89Id. 
90 Id. at 470. Others see money as central to reparations, even though they do not pro-
pose payments to individuals. As Professor Asante has phrased the issue, "[Olne way to 
approach the issue of reparations is to speak about money, but not necessarily about cash. 
Reparations will cost, but it will not have to be the giving out of billions of dollars of cash 
to individuals, although it will cost billions of dollars." Molefi Kete Asante, The African 
Aml?17can Warrant for Reparations: The Crime of European Enslavement of Ajiicans and Its Conse-
quences, in SHOULD AMERICA PAY?, supra note 6, at 3,12. 
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trust funds, would elect trustees. Nevertheless, as Westley acknowl-
edges, his plan needs considerable refinement.91 
Professor Asante provides a statement similar to Westley's about 
the range of potential reparations strategies: "Among the potential 
options are educational grants, health care, land or property grants, 
and a combination of such grants. Any reparations remedy should 
deal with long-term issues in the African American community rather 
than be a onetime cash payout. "92 
Professor McvVhorter's generally anti-reparations article argues 
that African Americans are already benefitting from his version of an 
ideal reparations system. In his view, community development corpo-
rations, incentives for banks to give loans to inner-city residents, and 
some affirmative action measures are sufficient forms of reparations. 
If I were assigned to develop a plan for black reparations, here 
is what I would do. I would institute a program for supporting 
poor black people for a few years, while stewarding them into 
jobs-which is currently in operation. I would have the gov-
ernment and private organizations channel funds into inner-
city communities to help residents buy their homes-which is 
what Community Development Corporations have been do-
ing for years, working under publicized miracles in ghettos 
across the country. I would give banks incentives to make 
loans to inner-city residents to start small businesses-which is 
what the Community Reinvestment Act has been doing since 
1977. I would make sure that there are scholarships to help 
black people go to school-which are hardly unknown in this 
country. I would propose affirmative action policies-of the 
thumb-on-the-scale variety designed to choose between 
equally qualified candidates-be imposed in businesses, 
where subtle racism can still slow promotions.93 
91 See Westley, supra note 2, at 470 ("In the end, determining a method by which all 
Black people can participate in their own empowerment will require a much more refined 
instrument than it would be appropriate for me to attempt to describe here."). 
92 Asante, supra note 90, at 12. Asante also proposes a commission to study reparations, 
educate the public about their importance, and make recommendations about further 
reparations. ld. 
93 John McWhorter, Against Reparations, in SHOULD AI-IERICA P.w?, supra note 6, at 193. 
Professor McWhorter concludes, "I do not believe that blacks should be left simply to pull 
ourselves up by the proverbial bootstraps. Our grim history is real. let so, too, are the 
reparations that we have already secured in the form of all these government programs 
and goyernmen t monies." ld. 
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Many reparationists will see McvVhorter's demands as too small, or as 
merely a list of the affirmative action programs already in place, which 
they believe have failed. Nevertheless, it is illuminating to read his 
catalog of existing programs, which he views as reparations. 
It is often easier to state aspirations rather than concrete plans. 
Sometimes even general goals are hard to articulate. Perhaps Arthur 
Serota has given us the best statement of what reparations promise: 
[T] here can be no elimination of poverty in America, no re-
building of lives for millions of Black Americans sweltering in 
urban chaos and isolated by rural deprivation, no chance for 
millions of urban black youth staring through prison bars, 
hiding from warrants, dropping out of school or negotiating 
the violence of urban battlefields, to contemplate and develop 
their futures without reparations. Reparations is not merely 
long overdue, it is a finance plan to implement a change.94 
Let us assume for the moment that a reparations plan includes 
the redistribution of wealth, so that it is distributed more or less 
equally on a per capita basis across racial groups. How might that be 
accomplished through a lawsuit? Or, to follow the agenda of critical 
race scholarship more generally, how might a court order lead to the 
breakdown of white privilege?95 It is an interesting thought-experi-
ment to contemplate what such an opinion might look like. 
In working toward any of these broad goals, reparationists will face 
problems with the dominant value in American law: that relief must be 
tied closely to harm, and that relief should meet with dessert. 96 There 
94 SEROTA, supra note 60, at 14 i. 
95 Professor Bell provides one example in his re-writing of the Brown decision. See Derrick 
Bell, Bell.j, dissenting., in WHAT "BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION" SHOULD HAVE SAID 185-
99 (jack 1\1. Balkin ed., 2002). But even that is phrased as a dissent, rather than a majority 
opinion. See Jordan Steiker, American Icon: Does It Matter What the Cow·t Said in Brown?, 81 TEx. 
L. REV. 305, 313-14 (2002) (discussing Bell's requirement of material equality rather than 
integration). Bell's "dissent" illustrates the extent to which critical race scholarship has (at 
least temporarily) abandoned in tegration as an ideal. Reparations fi ts with that goal, aban-
doning integration in favor of money. Or, phrased another way, reparations embraces the 
belief that money is a better way than equal treatment of purchasing equality. 
96 SeeJeffreyJ. Pyle, Note, Race. Equality and the Rille of Law: Critical Race Theory's Attack 
011 the Promises of Libemlism, 40 B.C. L. REV. i8i, 806 (1999) (d iscussing critical race scholar-
ship's focus on group-based relief rather than relief to individuals). The issue warrants 
substantially greater analysis, which should explore the ways that racial groups have been 
created, then subordinated, by law. Sec, e.g., "!estley, sllpm note 2, at 438-39. Of course, 
there remain critical issues of fairness: is continuing group-identification the best way (or 
even a good way) of remedying past race-conscious action? Every fair-minded person ac-
knowledges the sordid nature of race-conscious actions of the federal and state govern-
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will have to be an enormous reworking of American law to bring it into 
line with ideas about group-based reparations. Even the most radical 
structural injunctions, such as the busing in Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education and Keyes v. School Distlict No.1, DenvC/; 
Colorado, pale by comparison with what is necessary for reparations.97 
There were defined goals for those injunctions, where courts issued 
system-wide orders that restructured the entire distribution of benefits 
in society by addressing who attended which schools. There was not 
necessarily a close connection between the children being bused and 
those who had been subject to de jure segregation. Nevertheless, such 
relief was upheld as a forward-looking remedy; the Supreme Court 
sought to place the children in the position they would have been in 
absent past de jure segregation. As the Supreme Court phrased the is-
sue, "As with any equity case, the nature of the violation determines the 
scope of the remedy."98 Put another way, as I often ask my students in 
remedies: how closely must we tie relief to evidence of harm?99 
Swann represented the high-water mark for the idea of equity-
that a court has broad remedial powers to take action in order to place 
a plaintiff in a fair position. Swann seems to stand for the proposition 
ments; however, there is substantial debate over how to best remedy that legacy. How 
closely must the remedy be tied to the evidence of harm? 
97 SeeKeyesv. Sch. Dist. No.1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15,29-31 (1971). 
98 Swann, 402 U.S. at 16. 
99 Professor Laycock has phrased the issue similarly in DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN 
AMERICAN REMEDIES 1080 (2d ed. 1994). He begins his casebook with a takings case, in 
which Native Americans' animals were taken by the Department of Interior without due 
process. The court must then decide how to compensate the plaintiffs for the loss of their 
animals. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concludes that there cannot be a generalized 
finding of the value of animals; the trial court must make individual assessments. See id. at 
11-15 (reprinting United States v. Hatahley, 257 F.2d 920 (10th Cir. 1958». Laycock re-
turns again at the end of the casebook with the observation that the court's "decision 
reflects our legal system's traditional view that litigation remedies particular wrongs to 
particular plaintiffs. To change that practice as a general matter would require a wholly 
different law of remedies, and perhaps a wholly different role for courts in the constitu-
tional scheme." Id. at 1079. From that observation flows the question that reparations 
plaintiffs would have to answer to a court reviewing their claim for group relief: "If a rem-
edy is not designed to restore someone to his rightful position, in what sense is it a rem-
edy?" Id. at 1179. One answer is that the court might be remedying past generalized dis-
crimination by the Department of the Interior against the Native Americans who lost their 
livestock by granting a generous lump-sum payment. See id. at 1179. 
Of course, reparationists might reasonably argue that reparations payments are restoring 
plaintiffs to theu' rightful positions. But that will require extensive documentation about the 
nature of the past Uljury, as caused by the defendants (or their predecessors). See Brophy, 
supra note 10, at 517-19 (discussulg the problems of IUlkulg past harm to current plaintiffs). 
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that once a constitutional violation is established, an equity court has 
power to make broad injunctions to repair that damage. loo 
Plaintiffs now face a dramatically increased burden when seeking 
structural relief. They must show that the measure of relief is respon-
sive to the amount of harm. For instance, in the school discrimination 
context, the Supreme Court stated in Dayton Board of Education v. 
B'7nkll1a11101 that the courts must first determine how much past dis-
crimination by the school board has led to segregation within the 
school system. Then, ''The remedy must be designed to redress that 
difference. Only if there has been a system-wide impact may there be 
a system-wide remedy. "102 
Because lawsuits require a close connection between harm and 
relief and between wrongdoer and the person for whom relief is 
granted, it will be enormously difficult for reparations advocates to 
gain relief in many instances. Despite examples like Brown v. Board of 
Education,103 it is difficult to see how a lawsuit will rework fundamen-
tally the distribution of power and wealth in this country in a way that 
fits with reparationists' goals. Nevertheless, tort suits hold out appeal 
as vehicles for limited reparations in specific contexts-like the Tulsa 
riot of 1921 or cases where descendants of enslaved people are able to 
identifY the successors to the companies that benefited from their an-
cestors' labor. Tort suits hold ant even more promise as models for 
apportioning moral liability. 
B. Tort Law alld the Ele7l1euts of a Lawsuit: Remedying the Evils of SlavelY 
As both Professor Massey and Professor Hylton point out, a tort 
lawsuit requires an identifiable plain tiff104 who has suffered some 
harm that is caused by an identifiable defendant where the defendant 
100 Sec Owen M. Fiss, The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. RE\,. 1, 46 n.94 (1979) (stating 
that "Swanl1 sustained the most un tailored remedy imaginable"). Or, as Professor Laycock 
has called it, "an attempt to do complete equity, unconstrained by any direct link to a 
defined violation or the plaintiffs rightful position." LAYCOCK, supra note 99, at 283. 
101 433 U.S. 406 (1977). 
102 Id. at 420. 
103 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
104 Sec HYLTON, supra note 59, at 2-4; Massey, supra note 79, at 161-62. In the case of a 
class action, a group of plaintiffs must haye claims or defenses typical of those of the 
identifiable plaintiffs. Sec FED. R. C:n·. P. 23; ~lorris A. Ratner, Factors Impacting the Selection 
and Positioning of Human Rights Class Actions il1 United States Courts: A Practical Overview, 58 
N.Y.U. ANN. SUR\,. A~1. L. 623, 642 (2003). One of the most troubling aspects of the lawsuit 
against CSX and Aetna is that the plaintiff has not identified her relationship to anyone 
who was enslayed by CSX's predecessor or whose life was insured by Aetna. In essence, she 
asks for money for a harm that she has not suffered. See supra, note 26. 
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has a duty to the plaintiff. 105 What we need to show-skipping over 
problems of statutes of limitation for now-is that a duty was violated, 
leading to injury. The legal system responds well to an individualized 
plaintiff who can link harm directly to individualized defendants. It 
becomes harder to find a way for judges and the legal system to re-
spond as the connections between plaintiff and defendant become 
more tenuous. Causation is, indeed, a critical problem. One might 
diagram the problem like this: 
Slaves 
1 
Descendants of slaves 
1. Framing the Debate 
vs. 
vs. 
States that permitted slavery and 
slave owning corporations 
1 
Successors to states and 
corporations 
Much of the scholarship on slavery reparations-by both repara-
tionists and opponents-addresses the inability of the American legal 
system to respond adequately to system-wide racial crimes like slavery. 
Reparationists point critical fingers at the liberalism of American law, 
which is heavily based on the claims of individuals against other indi-
viduals. Professor Bradford blames the fundamen tal ideas of Ameri-
can law, arguing that" [b] ecause liberal law is essen tially politics, and 
because U.S. politics is essentially white supremacy, liberal law is struc-
turally incapable of yielding racial equality even if it formally rejects 
malign racial classifications and hierarchies. "106 At other times, the 
criticism is directed more narrowly against the requirement that there 
be identified defendants who caused harm to specified plaintiffs, as 
Professor Cook has done. 107 
105 The issue of identifying a defendant might be relaxed slightly in the case of enter-
prise liability, if the defendant is part of an industry that caused the plaintiff harm. In such 
a case, liability could be imposed based on the defendant's share in the industry. 
106 Bradford, supra note 83, at 96 n.458. 
107 Cook argues: 
A new paradigm is needed because the conventional paradigm of Constitu-
tional Liberalism limits our ability to draw legal and moral connections between 
the past injuries inflicted by slavery, segregation, and present racial disparities in 
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Many reparationists focus on community-based remedies, which 
draw more upon analogies to structural injunctions and other class ac-
tion remedies than upon payments to individuals. Such remedies, 
which focus on community-building measures like health and educa-
tion funds, could expand their focus to entire communities that are 
suffering. In some insta.nces, though no one has written about this in 
the reparations context yet, we might construct an entire bureaucratic 
system to weigh indhiduals' merits and award reparations according to 
their dessert. The sodal security system might serve as one example. JOs 
Opponents similarly emphasize the limitations of lawsuits, though 
they may focus less on attacking law's liberalism. Professor Hylton pre-
sents a particularly well thought out attack on tort law's inadequacy for 
compensating for the e\ils of slavery. 109 Let me establish what I believe 
his key points are. In opposition to many writers on American slavery, 
Hylton sees slavery as the absence of government. Defining slavery as 
essentially private conduct carries with it an important implication for 
later analysis: it limits federal and state governments' liability. By 
defining slavery as the absence of law, rather than, as I believe is more 
accurate, the creature of the deliberate actions of generations of 
American voters and legislators, Hylton leaves us with the sense that 
slavery is solely the fault of private actors. Now that those private actors 
are all dead, a logical conclusion is that there is no one from whom de-
scendants of slaves might appropriately seek compensation. 
The fact that slavery was legal-indeed protected by the federal 
Constitution in the years before the Thirteenth Amendment-may 
have other implications for the imposition of liability under tort law. 
Or, as Hylton says, 
There is no getting around the fact that any attempt to apply 
tort law to slavery means applying today's law to an institu-
income, wealth, employment. education, etc. This conyentional Liberal para-
digm discusses injury and remedy within carefully drawn parameters of indiyid-
ual fault and causation. Haying to identify a specific perpetrator who has caused 
a concrete injury to an identifiable victim makes it difficult to talk about soci-
ety's responsibility for the present effects of slavery and segregation. 
Cook, supra note 86, at 964-65 (citation omitted). 
108 Sec, e.g .. JERRY L l\L\SHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY 
DISABILITY CLAIMS 92-93 (1983) (focusing on the social security system). Professor Leslie 
Mansfield of the University of Tulsa, who is one of the hwyers in the case for the Tulsa riot 
victims, has suggested several other administrative models, including the mine workers' 
compensation program. 
109 Sec HYLTON, supra note 59, at 10; sec also l\fassey, SlljJr{/ note 79, at 158-61 (pointing 
out the difficulty of applying modern-day tort principles to the institution of slavery). 
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tion that existed within the law a century and [al half 
ago .... Applying today's law to events that happened within 
the law yesterday opens up a messy can of worms, to say the 
least. And once courts go along with plaintiffs and open up 
that can, it is not easy to see why the plaintiff's approach 
should be confined to slavery lawsuits. llo 
Hylton proposes one solution: to view slavery as an institution 
that was not legal. "[T]he appropriate model is one in which warlords 
have displaced the state and held it at bay while they imposed their 
own law on their subjected populations. "lll Yet that is completely 
wrong as a model for what happened in the United States. There were 
no conquering warlords; the vast majority of voters, northern and 
southern, embraced slavery. Hylton makes much of the legality of 
slavery. Nevertheless, the tort system can recognize a change in opera-
tive principles. vVe have seen in a series of products liability areas ret-
roactive application of liability. 112 Indeed, one virtue of a lawsuit is the 
ability to impose liability on past conduct. The fact that slavery was 
recognized by the federal and state governments, however, suggests 
the level of the problem, not that we cannot now rectifY the problem 
through a lawsuit. 
Hylton advances another argument regarding tort law: that "the 
institution [of slavery] may not have been as harmful as many have as-
serted. "113 Hylton develops his argument with several pages of discus-
sion, taken largely from Adam Smith's theorizing about the institution 
of slavery and from the work of economic historians Robert Fogel and 
Stanley Engermen. The point seems to be that "[i]f Fogel and Enger-
men are correct, slavery's victims would be unable to prove that they 
suffered substantial damages."1l4 From there Hylton hypothesizes that 
llO HYLTON, supra note 59, at 10. 
III [d. at 11. 
112 See, e.g., Costello v. Unarco Indus., Inc., 490 N.E.2d 675 (Ill. 1986) (reversing dis-
missal of a strict liability action in tort despite retroactive effect and an existing statute of 
repose) . 
113 HYLTON, supra note 59, at 12. 
114 [d. at 12-13. It is unnecessary to enter the Fogel-Engerman world in order to con-
template reparations. Nevertheless, it is important to recall that their work is largely dis-
credited. Many of the findings of Time on the Cross were called into disrepute in the years 
afterwards. See, e.g., PAUL A. DAVID ET AL., RECKONING WITH SLAVERY 339-57 (1976); HER-
BERT GEORGE GUTMAN, SLAVERY AND THE NUMBERS GAME: A CRITIQUE OF TIME ON THE 
CROSS 8-13 (1975). See generally ROBERT FOGEL & STANLEY ENGERMAN, TIME ON THE 
CROSS: THE ECONOMICS OF AMERICAN NEGRO SLAVERY (1974). It is similarly significant 
that legal scholars cite Time on the Cross far more frequen t1y than they cite either of the two 
books responding to it-and largely demolishing it. A recent Westlaw search in the 'Jour-
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slavery probably was more physically abusive in the deep South,115 
which is consistent with the general understanding of slavery. And that 
may suggest that the administrative system I suggested earlier would be 
the best model: we might use particularized inquiries about how slavery 
affected each individual's ancestors. 
Hylton's underlying point appears to be that slavery did not lead 
to the vast disparities in wealth and educational achievement between 
the black and white communities today. Instead he blames subsequent 
events, perhaps Jim Crow, although the typical argument among repa-
rations opponents is that black culture is to blame. Opponents, like 
Professor McWhorter and Abigail and Stephen Thermstrom, point to 
the high rate of single parents as a critical explanation for the differen-
tial wealth achievemen t. 116 Indeed, there is substantial question about 
the continued impact of slavery. Here tort law might provide a helpful 
framework for evaluating causation. \Nhat percentage of the harm, one 
might ask, is caused by slavery as opposed to other, intervening causes? 
Although some might have been able to overcome the harms of slavery, 
others might not have been so successful. Slawry, because of the mag-
nitude of the harm, may have led to further destruction. 
'Would the claims for reparations be false imprisonment, assault 
and battery, wrongful death, and, though Hylton fails to discuss this, 
common law enslavement? Hylton worries that there is an entire se-
ries of harms, like inability to marry or have a conventional marriage, 
that tort law does not contemplate.117 He labels these harms "social 
torts. "118 Hylton suggests that "the standard tort categories appear to 
nals and law reviews" database turned up forty-eight articles citing Time 011 tlte Cross. nine 
citing Reckonillg with Slrwcry. and eleven citing Slavery and the Numbers Game. Available at 
http://www.westlaw.com (last visited Nov. 26, 2003). 
115 Sec supra note 108. 
116 Sec. e.g., JOHN MCWHORTER, LOSING THE R'l.CE: SELF-SABOTAGE AND BLACK CUL-
TURE 9-10 (2000); THERNSTROM & TIIERNSTROM, sujJ1'(l note 84. at 337-4l. 
117 Sec HYLTON, supra note 59, at 23. 
118 Id. Let me leave aside for the moment the question of whether slaves were able to 
marry or have a com'entional marriage. Hylton's assumption that they could not suggests 
that from the vantage of the twenty-first century, it is difficult for us to see that slaves might 
have can'ed out a life within the system of slavery. In fact, much of the finest work of the 
1970s was devoted to showing that slaves could create a life independent of their slave 
masters. Sec, e.g .. EU(a:NE GENOVESE, ROl.L,jORDAN, ROLL, at xv-xvii (1973); CHARLES jOY-
NER, DOWN BY TIlE RIVERSIDE: A SOUTH CAROLINA SLAVE COMMUNITY, at xvii-xxii (1984). 
Ralph Ellison, author of Invisible lIlan, condemned modern social scientists for failing to 
see that slaves could carve out a productive life. Ellison's review of Gunnar Myrdal's Ameri-
can Dilemma built upon the idea-as did much of Ellison's work-that too much of Ameri-
can culture viewed Mrican Americans as objects rather than actors. Ellison struggled his 
whole life to correct that misperception: 
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be inadequate for many of the injuries connected to social torts."119 
Many of the social torts may be compensated through typical tort 
damages. Wrongful death incorporates loss of consortium; false im-
prisonment would also incorporate payment for loss of religion and 
loss of consortium. There is also the potential for a common law claim 
for slavery. Yet the damages are so great for typical torts associated 
with slavery that no one need worry that there may be other claims 
that are not compensable. The fact that there may be no tort known 
as "stealing a person's religion" does not mean that we cannot collect 
damages for such harm under common law false imprison men t or 
assault and battery.120 There may be some constitutional tort there, 
involving deprivation of religious freedom, but let me leave that aside 
for the moment. The fact that southern states made it a crime to 
teach slaves how to read-just one of the many horrible aspects of 
slavery-suggests to me that the states should now have some liability 
for the harm caused by that deprivation. 
Moreover, if this is a question about the use of tort law as a model 
for gauging reparations claims, then tort law could still provide a useful 
framework. There are substantially greater problems if we are taJking 
about using the legal system, because tort claims are so dependent 
upon evidence of harm. This leads to other questions about the nature 
of the harm. Can descendants of slaves stand in the shoes of their an-
cestors? 
The question becomes one of how we might use tort law for a 
reparations lawsuit. What is the harm that slave owners imposed on 
slaves? Here one sees multiple torts: assault and battery, conversion of 
property, false imprisonment. One wonders what to make of the fact 
that slavery was legal; indeed, that it received state sanction. It would 
have been laughable for a slave to file a sHit in the antebellum era to 
recover for the evils of slavery, precisely because slavery was state-
[Clan a people (its faith in an idealized American Creed notwithstanding) 
live and develop for over three hundred years simply by reacting? Are Ameri-
can Negroes simply the creation of white men, or have they at least helped to 
create themselves out of what they found around them? Men have made a way 
of life in caves and upon cliffs; why cannot Negroes have made a life upon the 
horns of the white man's dilemma? 
RALPH ELLISON, An American Dilemma: A Review, in COLLECTED ESSAYS OF RALPH ELLISON, 
supra note 14, at 339. 
119 HYLTON, supra note 59, at 23. 
120 There may be some constitutional tort there, involving deprivation of religiolls 
freedom, but this discussion should be left for another time. 
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sanctioned. Does that mean, however, that there could be no retroac-
tive liability imposed once slavery ended? One of the virtues of law-
suits is that courts can impose retroactive liability more easily than 
could a legislature. 
A related issue is whether a claim exists against states for permit-
ting slavery. The states established the legal framework that permitted 
the exploitation of African Americans. They established laws with the 
understanding that particular people would be enslaved, separated 
from their families, denied education-just about everything that can 
be done to destroy a person's humanity was contemplated or man-
dated by the laws of the slave states.'21 It seems likely that former 
slaves could assert a claim against states if they could surmount prob-
lems of sovereign immunity. 
The problem becomes more complex, however, when one con-
siders subsequent generations. Descendants of slaves who sue corpo-
rations essentially stand in the shoes of their ancestors. They might 
assert at least the same claims their ancestors had, in the nature of a 
survival action. A further problem is how to measure damages when 
lawsuits recognize subsequent generations. Certainly, the harm to the 
slaves was enormous. But can subsequent generations recover for 
those harms? Are harms to the children of victims recoverable? Is 
there an analogy to loss of consortium?122 Would that analogy allow 
those who were not born at the time of the torts to recoYer? Would 
those who were not born to the immediate tort victims be eligible for 
recovery? Alternatively, might those remote descendants have an in-
dependent claim? In such a scenario, there would be no direct rela-
tionship between the descendants and the defendants; nevertheless, 
there would be harm. Might there be a claim-as some descendants 
of those who ingested harmful medicine have asserted-against the 
original tortfeasors?123 Liability for preconception torts is limited, 
121 Sec ge1lerally HARRIET BEECHER STOWE, A KEY TO UNCU TOM'S CABIN 124-223 (\Vil-
liam Loren IblZ ed., Arno Press 1968) (1854) (summarizing statutory law of slaye states). 
122 Typically in cases of loss of consortium, those who may make a claim are limited to 
close family members, and sometimes e\'en to those who are dependent on the decedent 
for support. Sec, e.g., ]\[itchell Y. United States, 141 F.3d 8, 19-20 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding 
that adult nondependent children may recoyer); ]\[asunaga y. Gapasin, 790 P.2d 171, 176-
77 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990) (disallowing reco\'ery for nondependent parents). Or maybe 
there is an argument for loss of inheritance. Sec LAYCOCK, supra note 99, at 153-54. 
123 Sec, e.g., Albala y. New York, 429 N.E.2d 786, 787 (N.\: 1981) (limiting claims based 
on the belief that it would "require the extension of traditional tort concepts beyond man-
ageable bounds"); W. PAGE KEETON ET Al ... PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 55, 
at 367-70 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing legal right of child to sue for the consequences of 
prenatal injuries). Sec generally Julie A. Greenberg, Rcconceptualizillg Preco1lcejJtion Torts, 64 
122 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 24:81 
largely for prudential reasons of trying to maintain questions of proof 
and liability within reasonable boundaries. 
As the discussion above indicates, simply trying to frame repara-
tions claims is problematic. The task for reparationists is to create a 
line of causation linking past harm to present conditions. Reparation-
ists then must fit such a causal line into a framework that courts will 
be willing to recognize. 124 
2. Identifying the Tort of Slavery 
The compulsion to labor constitutes a main contour of the tort of 
slavery. Several cases from the post-Civil "Var federal courts provide use-
ful guidance on this point. 125 Damages are substa.ntially more difficult 
to determine. Following the lead of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, one 
might first define the tort of slavery, then define what is recoverable 
under it. Perhaps we would consider the harm of the tort of slavery as 
continuing down to each generation for which one could prove dam-
age. Even though the harm took place in 1850, there may be continu-
ing harm. That raises substantial problems of proof. It also leads to 
significant questions of whether slavery or subsequent discrimination 
during the era of Jim Crow caused the present harm. Are those subsidi-
ary claims? The cause of action might be in the name of the original 
enslaved person, with descendants entitled to bring suit in the nature 
of a survival action. 
If we consider that there might be a separate action-something 
independen t of a survival action-then we need evidence for causa-
tion. How much did the institution of slavery affect its direct victims 
and their descendants? For purposes of considering tort law as a basis 
for a lawsuit, I would argue that there is ample connection and liabil-
ity. Resolving the problem of linking past torts to present harm is 
critical to discussing reparations within the context of tort law. In or-
der to resolve these issues, we need systematic research that links cur-
rent harm to slavery. The legacy of slavery on African Americans is 
one of the most hotly contested issues throughout the social sciences 
TENN. L. REV. 315 (1997) (discussing whether limiting liability in preconception actions is 
consistent with the purposes of tort law). 
124 Courts tend to limit compensable harm to that which is proximately caused by the 
harm. See, e.g., Pruitt v. Allied Chem. Corp., 523 F. Supp. 975, 978-83 (E.D. Va. 1981) (lim-
iting liability for damage caused by dumping chemicals in the James River and Chesapeake 
Bay). 
125 See, e.g., United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 934-40 (1988) (providing a con-
temporary example of an involun tary servitude case). 
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from the 1940s through today.126 There is no easy answer to these 
questions. One might look to Stephen and Abigail Thernstrom's 
America in Black and White: One Nation, Indivisible, which blames Mri-
can-American culture, not American society, for the chasm between 
white and black economic status.127 On the other side, a leading work 
is Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton's American ApaTtheid: Segregation 
and the Making of the Underclass. Massey and Denton's book, while not 
as comprehensive in scope as the Thernstroms'-it focuses on racial 
segregation-lays much of the blame on factors external to the Mri-
can-American community. American Apartheid concludes that "racial 
segregation" and its characteristic institutional form, the black ghetto, 
are the key structural factors responsible for the perpetuation of black 
poverty in the United States.128 As we explore the legacy of slavery in 
its present manifestation of gross inequality, we can apportion dam-
ages based on how much we determine slavery caused that inequality. 
3. Derivative Claims 
Reparations litigation raises several further questions: what is the 
purpose of the tort cause of action, and what is the measure of dam-
ages? Is the damage only located in the slave? Or do we take into con-
sideration succeeding generations? 
126 See ELLISON, supra note 14, at 332 (noting Gunar M}Tdal's attempt to debunk 
pseudo-scientific literature that had used slavery to confirm Mrican-American inferiority). 
127 THERNSTROM & THERNSTROM, supm note 84, at 337-41; see also Stephen Thern-
strom & Abigail Thernstrom, Reflections 011 the Shape of the River; 46 UCLA L. REV. 1583, 
1606 (1999) (criticizing evaluations of black academic underperformance that fail to ac-
count for the effect of peer culture). 
128 DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND 
TIlE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 9 (1993). The appropriate measure of relief for slavery 
reparations ought to be the amount of damage that the institution of slavery imposed on 
subsequent generations. Cj Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 420 (1977) 
("[TJhe District Court ... must determine how much incremental segregative effect these 
violations had on the racial distribution of the Dayton school population as presently consti-
tuted, when that distribution is compared to what it would have been in the absence of such 
constitutional violations. The remedy must be designed to redress that difference."); George 
Schedler, Responsibility for and Estimation of the Damages of American Slavery, 33 U. MEM. L. REv. 
307,338 (2003) ("W'e need to be certain that the the difficulties Mrican Americans now face 
are due to slavery, rather than racism that would have pervaded the United States even if it 
had no history of slavery. "). I think Professor Schedler overstates the level of proof repara-
tionists need to advance when he states, 'We need assurance that factors apart from the leg-
acy of slavery, such as religious beliefs, cultural values, and genetics, play no role before we 
can be assured that slavery is the cause." Schedler, supra, at 338-39. The question is not one 
of eliminating all other causes, but of determining with reasonable certainty the extent of 
slavery's impact on subsequent generations. 
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Professor Hylton speaks of the problem of suits by succeeding 
generations as a problem with derivative claims. He uses analogies to 
cases like Ryan v. New York Central Railroad, which is a favorite of torts 
casebooks. In that case, a railroad engine threw off sparks igniting a 
house on fire, which ultimately resulted in numerous homes burning 
down. The moral of Ryan is one of courts using judicial doctrine to 
limit the liability of an industry courts wanted to promote. The New 
York Court of Appeals considered distinguishing cases where fire was 
the result of negligence-as in that case-and cases where fire was the 
result of intentional actions. Perhaps those who commit intentional 
torts should have greater culpability for the harm they cause than 
those who are merely negligent, the court seemed to suggest. The 
court rested on another distinction, though-that the destruction of 
the first house was the "ordinary and natural result of its being fired." 
The court thought the destruction of the other houses was "not a 
necessary or a usual result." Moreover, imposing liability would poten-
tially ruin the defendant: 
In a country where wood, coal, gas, and oils are universally 
used, where men are crowded together into cities and vil-
lages, where servants are employed, and where children find 
their home in all houses, it is impossible, that the most vigi-
lant prudence should guard against the occurrence of acci-
dental or negligent fires .... No community could long exist, 
under the operation of such a principle.129 
Ryan receives frequent criticism because it made those unfortunate 
enough to live along the railroad bear the costs of development. All of 
this suggests that we can impose a different set of standards if we view 
the equities differently-if, for instance, we do not want to protect the 
institution of slavery.13o 
129 Ryan v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 35 N.Y. 210, 216-17 (1866). After reading Ryan, one 
might ask Professor Schwartz to remind us why he thinks nineteenth century tort law was 
so plaintiff-friendly. See Gary T. Schwartz, The Character of Early American Tort Law, 36 UCLA 
L. REV. 641, 685-87 (1989); cf. Robert]. Kaczorowski, The Common-Law Background of Nine-
teenth-Century Tort Law, 51 OHIO ST. LJ. 1127, 1151-57 (1990) (discussing cases recogniz-
ing right of common carriers to exempt themselves from strict liabilty and gross negli-
gence). 
130 Of course, some tort cases in the nineteenth century were premised on that idea 
that slavery should be promoted. See, e.g., Snee v. Trice, 3 S.C.L. (1 Brev.) 178 (S.C. 1802) 
(limiting liability for field burned by slaves' negligence); see also William W. Fisher, Ideology 
and Imagery in the Law of Slavery, 69 CHI. KENT L. REV. 1051, 1060 & nA9 (1993) (discussing 
SlIee). Snee is a remarkable case, a strong parallel to Ryan. And it is one that (I think) ought 
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Professor Hylton also discusses the nineteenth century's limita-
tion of wrongful death claims. The limitations Hylton discusses should 
not be a precedent for us now, because we are currently trying to 
undo the problems we have inherited from that era. Throughout the 
slavery era, owners did have a cause of action for someone who killed 
their slave.l 31 I would actually like to know a lot more about wrongful 
death in the nineteenth century. That is an important topic and a 
quick reading of cases discloses that some courts were willing to im-
pose liability in the absence of a statute and that legislatures fre-
quently imposed liability by statute. 132 All of that suggests that it is not 
unreasonable to impose liability for torts associated with slavery. But 
for our purposes, we can safely say that even at the time, law protected 
masters' interests in slaves' lives. It is therefore not much of a leap for 
us to recognize a cause of action that protects the slaves' interest in 
their own livesP33 
to be included in casebooks along with Ryan. for it illustrates the economic and social 
bases underlying decisions regarding proximate cause in tort. 
131 Sec Hedgepeth v. Robertson, 18 Tex. 858 (1857); Harvey v. Epes, 53 Va. (12 Gratt.) 
153 (1855); Grayv. Crocheron, 8 Port. 191 (Ala. 1838). Some cases employed the language 
of moral philosophy, holding a person who sold liquor to a slave liable for the slave's 
death. Sec Harrison v. Berkley 32 S.C.L. (1 Strob.) 525 (S.C. 1847); Delery v. Mornet, 11 
l\Iart. (o.s.) 4 (La. 1822). One might inquire how courts' desire to impose liability on those 
who interfered with the slave system led to innovation in tort law? 
132 Sec, e.g .. Knightstown & S.R. Co. v. Lindsay, 8 Ind. 278 (1856) (Indiana statute); Do-
edt v. Wiswall, 15 How. Pl'. 128 (N.l: Sup. Ct. 1857) (imposing liability, relying upon New 
lark wrongful death statute); Langlois v. Buffalo & Rochester R.R. Co., 19 Barb. 364 (N.l: 
Sup. Ct. 1854) (imposing liability in absence of statute); Dunhene's Adm'x v. Ohio Life 
Ins. & Trust Co., 12 Ohio Dec. Reprint 608 (Ohio Super. Ct. 1856) (Ohio wrongful death 
statute). The common law's reasons for refusing compensation for wrongful death are 
surveyed in Connecticut lI1ut. Life Ins. Co. v. New York & N.H.R. Co., 25 Conn. 265 (1856). 
Justice Storrs discloses the bases for limiting liability and suggests how cold-hearted the 
common law was in this area. Sec also Carey v. Berkshire R. Co., 55 Mass. 475 (1848) (not-
ing Massachusetts' lack of a ,nongful death statute). 
133 But the larger point is not just that tort law in the nineteenth century was narrow 
and generally unprotective of individuals. Hylton is correct, of course, that it is unclear 
how much slavery, as opposed to other factors, has hindered individuals and led to the 
current chasm between African-American and non-Hispanic white income. That is a topic 
that needs much more evidence and discussion. See generally MICHAEL K. BROWN ET AL., 
WHITEWASHING RACE: THE l\!YTH OF A COLOR-BLIND SOCIETY (2003) (arguing that racism 
remains a prevalent force in America and questioning the analvsis of those who promote 
"color-blind" social policy). Reparations skeptics are beginning to explore this question: to 
what extent did slavery harm the current generation? See, e.g., Stephen Kershnar, Repara-
tions for Slavery and justice, 33 U. MEM. L. REV. 277, 278-82 (2003) (arguing that contempo-
rary slave descendants are not unjustly harmed by the ensla"ement of ancestors). 
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4. Unjust Enrichment and Slavery Reparations 
There is yet another approach to considering the torts related to 
slavery: contemplating the use of unjust enrichment actions. 134 While 
it is suggestive to say-as reparationists sometimes do-that those who 
have benefited from slavery are "unjustly enriched,"135 those rhetori-
cal statements merely postpone "to a separate inquiry whether a par-
ticular transaction is productive of unjust enrichment or not. "\36 As 
the American Law Institute's discussion draft of the Restatement (Third) 
of Restitution and Unjust Emichmellt points out, there are "numerous 
cases in which natural justice and equity do not in fact provide an 
adequate guide to decision, and would not do so even if their essen-
tial requirements could be treated as self-evident. "137 The Restatement's 
drafters point out the difference between moral and legal objections 
to retention of property. Only those transactions where there is "un-
justified enrichment" contain a necessary prerequisite for a lawsuit.138 
The critical question then becomes, was there an "adequate legal 
basis for taking the labor?"139 The Restatement provides a limited foun-
dation for determining when benefits are conferred without adequate 
basis. In the context of slavery, one might argue that the benefits were 
conferred under duress, which left the taker without title. l4O Alterna-
tively, one might conclude that the benefits were obtained by tort, 
such as conversion or trespass. l41 In both cases, one confronts the 
problem that slavery was recognized as legal in its time. Thus a court 
approaching a claim of unjust enrichment might well conclude that 
during the period when slavery was recognized as legal in the United 
134 Sometimes we consider unjust enrichment under the heading of tort and other 
times under a separate heading of "unjust enrichment." While most of the following dis-
cussion derives from the consideration of unjust enrichment as an independent action-
not as a tort-I think it is important to discuss here, for the sake of completeness. See Doug-
las Laycock, The Scope and Significance of Restitution, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1277, 1279-83 (1989). 
135 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 (Discus-
sion Draft, Mar. 31, 2000). 
136Id. 
137Id. 
138 Id. Elsewhere the Restate11lent refers to unjust enrichment as the "transfer of a 
benefit without adequate legal ground." Id. 
139 See id. 
140 RESTATEMENT, supra note 134, at § 14(3) ("If a wrongful threat is tantamount to 
physical compUlsion, a transfer induced thereby is void, and the purported transferee ob-
tains no title."). 
141 There is not yet a section exploring the nature of those breaches, but they are 
scheduled to appear as § 37. Id. at xxi. 
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States, benefits extracted from enslaved people are not recoverable in 
restitution. 
There is some recent precedent, however, to suggest that courts 
will look beneath a transaction to ask whether it is legal in some fun-
damental sense, rather than merely technically or temporarily legal. In 
Altmann "(I. Republic of Austria,142 for example, the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals revived a claim for six Gustav Klimt paintings that had been 
stolen from a family during the Holocaust. Though the actions might 
have been legal nnder the existing regime, the court concluded the 
actions could not be legal under international law. Therefore, the heirs 
of the people from whom the property was t.'lken might assert an unjust 
enrichment claim for its retnrn.143 In the case of slavery, a similar unjust 
enrichment claim is particularly compelling. Because Ul~ust enrich-
ment focuses on benefits or tangible property that is still ret.'lined, 
there is a connection between past wrongdoing and present benefit 
that is much easier to see than in many reparations cases. Moreoyer, the 
moral claim that one person has property that rightfully belongs to an-
other is easier to establish than the claim that taxpayers who may have 
no benefit and who took no part in the wrongdoing must pay. 
There remains a critical problem with an unjust enrichment 
claim for slavery: that slavery was legal at the time. Grappling with the 
former legality of slavery requires a court to examine the legality of a 
system that has since been rejected and was subject to challenge at the 
time. Those working within the southern legal system recognized 
property rights in humans as the basis for the slave system. Repara-
tionists are now asking for an accounting of the benefits of that labor. 
In some ways, the legality of slavery, the recognition that slaves pro-
duced something valuable, can be the basis for a claim. l44 
142 317 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2002) 
143Id. 
144 There is a series of cases that recognized the slave owner's property interest in 
sla\'es, and protected that interest. See, c.g., Wilkinson v. Moseley, 30 Ala. 562, 573-77 
(1857) (limiting subcontractor's rights to employ slave in trade specified in contract); Car-
ter v. Streator, 49 N.C. (1 Jones) 62, 63 (1856) (upholding judgment against defendant 
\\'ho wrongfully seized and sold slave belonging to plaintiff). \\11en other people injured 
slaves, those people were liable to the owners. Sec, e.g., Seay v. Marks, 23 Ala. 532, 536-37 
(1853) (permitting owner to sue contracting party for value of slave who was killed while 
engaged in activity not covered by the contract); Harrison v. Lloyd, 17 S.C.L. (9 Rich.) 161, 
166-67 (S.C. 1851) (providing that slaveowner may recover value of slave who was \\Tong-
fully killed while in custody of defendant); Lacoste v. Pipkin, 11 Miss. (13 S. & M.) 589,591 
(1850) (reversing judgment against defendant, but reiterating that injuring party may be 
liable for damage to slaves). 
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It is not outlandish to make a claim for what everyone under-
stood was property. At the time, when someone else took slaves' labor 
without permission from their owners, those converters were liable. 
Why should we not now recognize the slaves' rights in their own labor, 
at least to the extent that their labor continues to provide benefits in 
2003? Even if a court is unwilling to impose a quasi-contract basis of 
recovery based on the conclusion that slavery was legal, it might be 
willing to use restitution as a measure of recovery for torts associated 
with slavery, such as assault. In that case, restitution might provide a 
measure of recovery.145 
The unjust enrichment rationale is particularly complicated be-
cause it deals with rights to iden tifiable property. There are two 
claimants in this model: the descendant of the slave and the subse-
quent purchaser of the property; often both are innocent, but the 
property must be apportioned to one or the other. There are particu-
larly strong equities in the case of the current possessor who is a gra-
tuitous beneficiary of the original wrongdoer. The statute of limita-
tions does not offer strong support for disgorging a benefit from 
someone who has received it unjustly. If there still were slaveholders 
alive, the case against unjust possessors would be compelling. In a 
manner of speaking, there still are some who hold property from 
slaveholders-the gratuitous beneficiaries of those slaveholders,146 
Moreover, courts recognized the owner's property rights in slaves when others injured 
them. See, e.g., Knox v. N.C. R.R. Co., 51 N.C. (1 Jones) 415,416-17 (1859) (placing bur-
den of proof of cause of death on hirer and otherwise permitting suit for wrongful death); 
Helton v. Caston, 8 S.C.L. (2 Bail.) 95 (S.C. 1831) (permitting suit by owner against con-
tractor who beat slave). Such cases illustrate the well-developed rules around slave labor as 
property and the liability of whites who abused slaves to slave owners. Those rules establish 
a complex network of duties among whites and illustrate the relationship of white owners, 
white non-owners, and slaves. That world of property relationships established that, while 
owners might have virtual license to treat their slaves however they would like, whites who 
"rented" slaves from their owners were responsible to the owners for harm to the slave. 
145 See LAYCOCK, supra note 99, at 1279 (observing that restitution is both a recovery 
for unjust enrichment and a measurement of enrichment). There are several instances in 
which to invoke restitution, for example, when it provides a substantive basis for recovery. 
That is the case for those who claim restitution based on their ancestors' work with pay. 
Alternatively, there may already be a basis for recovery-such as tort-but the measure of 
damages is inadequate or difficult to prove. For example, it may be impossible to show 
amount of harm. Restitution provides a concrete, though often rather limited, measure of 
harm. See, e.g. Olwell v. Nye & Nissen Co., 26 P.2d 282, 286 (Wasil. 1946) (holding that for 
an action in restitution, respondent is entitled to the measure of restoration that accom-
panies the remedy). 
146 I have suggested how this claim might work against a charitable organization that is 
the beneficiary of a gift by a slaveholder. There is still a problem with the statute of limita-
tions. See Brophy, supra note 10, at 514-15. 
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Here tracing is important, because it allows us to follow assets into a 
new form-the innocent beneficiary of another's wrong. Professor 
Palmer has stated the case as "[o]ne who is the innocent recipient of a 
benefit that came from the plaintiff by virtue of a wrongful act of a 
third person is obliged to make restitution, unless he gave value for 
the benefit. "147 "Vhen we have a beneficiary of a gratuitous transfer, 
there is at least the possibility of treating that beneficiary as standing 
in the shoes of, and taking the property subject to the same obliga-
tions as, the grantor.148 
Altman points to the utility of an unjust enrichment claim, par-
ticularly where there is identifiable property: one can trace that 
wrongfully acquired property through other hands, even those of sub-
sequent innocent purchasers. While I recognize that such a claim is 
fanciful and requires a suspension of the statute of limitations, one 
might conduct a thought-experiment along the following lines: 
(1) The labor of enslaved people was unjustly converted and used to 
build a plantation home or some other tangible property 
that continues to exist today; that labor can then be traced 
into a new form-the plantation house. 
(2) Particularly in cases where the property is gratuitously trans-
ferred, there is a claim between descendants of the enslaved 
people and the current possessor of the property. 
(3) Even in cases where the property has been sold, the people whose 
labor was converted might have a claim against the subse-
quent purchaser. In a limited number of cases, constructive 
trusts imposed on real property allow the trust beneficiary to 
trump the claims of a bona fide creditor.149 
5. Sample Damages Formulas 
If we are going to have a tort that seeks to compensate for the 
harms of slavery to subsequent generations-that is, unless we are go-
ing to limit the recovery of damages to the immediate victim and ref-
use to permit consideration of harm to subsequent generations-then 
we need to prove with specificity how slavery affected each subsequent 
147 Seel GEORGE PALMER. LAW OF RESTITUTION § 2.20 (1978). 
148 See U.S. for Use of Palmer Constr., Inc. v. Cal. State Elec., 940 F.2d 1260, 1262 (9th 
Cir.1991). 
149 Such cases are limited, but on occasion either constructive trust or equitable liens 
can be used to trump a prior, bona fide purchaser or creditor. 
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generation. That will make for some interesting trials. Let me suggest 
several possible models of liability in a suit by descendants of enslaved 
people for the torts of slavery imposed on their ancestors: 
(1) in the nature of a survival action: damages are calculated accord-
ing to the damage done to the decendants' ancestors. 
(2) in the nature of loss of consortium claim: damages are the harms 
that slavery imposes on the subsequent generations, which 
involve proof of damage due to torts of slavery. 
(3) in the nature of unjust enrichment: damages are the benefits an-
cestors conferred on others, which are still retained. 
There remains, however, the problem of calculating the harm of 
slavery. To what extent does the institution of slavery continue to have 
an effect on the decendants of slaves? One way to investigate the ef-
fects of slavery is to look at the current gap between Mrican-American 
and white income. Let me suggest the following as a basic measure for 
damages: the measure of the hal'ln to each individual slave is the difference 
between that slave's descendants' income and the average income of white 
Americans. Perhaps the equation should be altered in order to account 
for causes other than slavery that contributed to slave's descendants' 
poverty. Such a formula would offer a starting point for a compensa-
tion scheme, but it does not necessarily work justice for individuals 
because it offers no compensation to those descendants of slaves who 
earn above white income, regardless of how much they were injured 
by the institution of slavery. Another possible formulation of the harm 
is that it is the difference between a descendant's income and the amount nec-
essary to reach the poverty line. That would offer a much more modest 
accounting of the damage, though it would also focus the govern-
ment's limited resources on those in the worst financial plight. 
A formula that only takes account of differences between the in-
come of Mrican Americans and white Americans cannot address the 
host of other legacies of slavery and Jim Crow-decades of under-
compensated labor, lost educational opportunities, and the lack of 
hope that derive from it. The list of harms is nearly interminable. 
However, the difference in current income is something that is easily 
measured and is-reparationists will arglle-a continuing harm of 
slavery that ought to be addressed. 
III. THE PURPOSES OF REPARATIONS 
Reparations discourse ultimately demands an answer to the ques-
tion, what is the purpose of reparations? What do we want to achieve 
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with them? The movemen t for reparations is at bottom a question 
about the distribution of wealth and whether long-ago crimes that 
continue to have effects ought to be remedied. Professor Marable, 
one of the leading reparations advocates, recently stated in a speech 
at Columbia Law School that reparations is not about integration. 
"This is a black freedom struggle. Two things we've never had are 
freedom and justice. "150 
It is sometimes difficult to fit reparations claims within a legal 
framework, because it is sometimes difficult to frame the Mrican-
American experience within tlle (somewhat arbitrary) boundaries of the 
law. One might tllink of Ralph Ellison's postl1Umous novel Juneteenth, 
which aims at exploring how people constructed a life independent of 
the law. Jazz-musician-turned-minister Alonzo Hickman tried to bring up 
his adopted son, Bliss, to appreciate his ideals in hopes that Bliss, who 
could pass for white, would later teach those values to the white commu-
nity. Hickman remembered that ''we took the child and tried to seek the 
end of the old brutal dispensation in the hope that a little gifted child 
would speak for our condition from inside the only acceptable mask. "151 
Indeed, the young child's motller, who had falsely accused Hickman's 
brotller of raping him, for which he was lynched, thought that Bliss 
might be a vehicle for spreading such lessons. 'Take him, let him share 
your Negro life and whatever it is that allowed you to help us all these 
days. Let him learn to share tlle forgiveness your life has taught you to 
squeeze from it," she instructed Hickman.152 
150 Manning Marable, 40 Acres & A l\Iule: The Case for Black Reparations, Remarks at 
the Paul Robeson Lecture, Columbia Law School (Feb. 27, 2003), available at http://www.law. 
columbia.edu/law_school/ education_tech/streaming/video_1 (last visited Nov. 12, 2003). 
151 RALPH ELLISON,JUNETEENTH 271 (john F. Callahan ed., 2000) (1999). 
[T) here are facts and there is truth; don't let the facts ever get in the way of 
your recognizing and living out the truth. And don't get the truth confused 
with the law. The law deals with facts, and down here the facts are that we are 
weak and inferior. But while it looks like we are what the law says we are, don't 
ever forget that we've been put in this position by force, by power of num-
bers, and the readiness of those numbers to use brutality to keep us within 
the law. Ah, but the truth is something else. vVe are not what the law, yes and 
custom, says we are and to protect our truth we have to protect ourselves from 
the definitions of the law. Because the law's facts have made us outlaws. Yes, 
that's the truth, but only part of it; for Bliss, boy, we're outlaws in Christ and 
Chri5t is the higher truth. 
Id. at 354. 
152 !d. at 308. 
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Some reparationists believe that reparations talk may be a way of 
teaching the larger community about the values of love.153 This is a 
task that will involve the entire community-and one that will require 
both payment and forgiveness. Reverend Hickman spoke in Juneteenth 
about the mutuality of relationships: 
It takes two to make a bargain or to bury a hatchet, or even 
to forget words uttered in dedication and taken deep into 
the heart and made sanctified by suffering[.J Blood spilled 
in violence doesn't just dry and drift away in the wind, no! It 
cries out for restitution, redemption [.J 154 
Bliss did not fulfill those hopes, instead becoming the racist, race-
baiting Senator Sunraider! Yet in his last speech in the Senate, given 
as an assassin focused his gun sights on him, Sunraider spoke through 
that mask. He said that history has given us three questions: "How can 
the many be as one? How can the future deny the Past? And How can 
the light deny the dark?"I!>!> This is certainly a mission that many, many 
people will have to be involved in if we are to find a way for "the fu-
ture to deny the past," by which Ellison meant overcoming the past 
and creating a future in which all people participate.156 'Ve are fortu-
nate that, on the day that I finished the draft of this Article in the 
summer of 2003, President Bush delivered a speech in Senegal recog-
nizing the atrocity of slavery and the slave trade-and urging some-
thing to repair that damage.157 That speech, it seems to me, is a prod-
uct of the reparations movement. 
153 See Cook, supra note 86, at 981. I wonder whether Cook's suggestions actually will 
achieve his goal. While he speaks a language of love, his demands run all one way: towards 
more payments to the Mrican-American community. Much is owed; however, articles that 
demand payments in the name of love and yet offer no forgiveness in return-or even the 
suggestion of forgiveness-are, at best, incomplete. 
154 ELLISON, supra note 151, at 271. 
155 Id. at 19. 
156 Id. Sunraider's-Ellison's-answer to the second question is to remember that: 
[Gjiven the nature of our vision, of our covenant, to remember is to forget 
and to forget is to remember selectively, creatively! Yes, and let us remember 
that in this land to create is to destroy, and to destroy-if we will it so and 
make it so, ifwe pay our proper respect to remembered but rejected things-is 
to make manifest our lovely dream of progressive idealism. 
Id. at 19-20. Ellison works out some of his themes of selective history in his essay, Going to 
the Territory. See ELLISON, supra note 14, at 595-96. 
157 See Richard W. Stevenson, Bush, in Africa, Promises Aid but Offers No Troops for Liberia, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 9,2003, at A8. 
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Another important part of the reparations movement is recover-
ing our shared history and showing how it differs from the myths we 
hold in our collective conscience. That new history-if people will 
believe it-might lead to a remaking of society. It might break down 
what Ralph Ellison referred to in Invisible Man as the myths that 
"keepers [of power] keep their power by. "158 
If those are the goals, then reparations may indeed prove difficult 
to obtain. Often when people speak about justice, particularly in the 
context of reparations and unjust enrichment, there is a repeated 
theme of trying to place people in the position they would have been 
in but for the harm. Professor Nozick speaks about these issues in 
terms of rectification-how judgments that aim to correct injustice 
inform us about the ways property should have been distributed: 
This principle uses historical information about previous 
situations and injustices done in them, and information 
about the actual course of events that flowed from these in-
justices, until the present, and it yields a description (or de-
scriptions) of holdings in the society. The principle of 
rectification presumably will make use of its best estimate of 
subjunctive information about what would have occurred 
(or a probability distribution over what might have occurred, 
using the expected value) if the injustice had not taken 
place. If the actual description of holdings turns out not to 
be one of the descriptions yielded by the principles, then 
one of the descriptions must be realized.159 
158 RALPH ELLISON, INVISIBLE l\IAN 432 (Modern History ed. 1992) (1952). Ellison is 
talking about the execution of brother Tod Clifton and how the knowledge of the true 
history is erased by the failure to record it: 
Id. 
I tried to step away and look at it from a distance of words read in books, half-
remembered. For history records the patterns of men's lives .... All things, it is 
said, are duly recorded-all things of importance, that is. But not quite, for actu-
allv it is onlv the knmm, the seen, the heard and only those events that the re-
corder regards as inlportant that are put dmm, those lies his keepers keep their 
power by. But the cop ,,,ould be Clifton's historian, his judge, his witness, and his 
executioner, and I was the only brother in the watching crowd. And I, the only 
witness for the defense, knew neither the extent of his guilt nor the nature of his 
crime. Where were the historians today? And how would they put it down? 
159 Nozick's description has captured much attention. It is quoted in Jeremy Waldron, 
Redressing Historic Injustice, 52 U, TORONTO LJ. 135, 144 (2002) and GREGORY S. ALEXAN-
DER, THE LIMITS OF PROPERTY REPARATIONS 5 (SOc. Sci. Research Network, \\Torking Pa-
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Professor Waldron emphasizes the problems entailed in trying to 
follow Nozick's suggestion that we try to put people back into the posi-
tion they would have been in without the past injustice. Waldron uses 
the example of a native tribe whose land was taken wrongfully genera-
tions ago. Where would they be now without that taking, he asks? Per-
haps they would have sold the land and spent the income from the sale 
generations ago. Indeed, it is possible they would be in the same posi-
tion they are in today. The problems with such counterfactual hy-
potheticals are, even after a few generations, immense. Waldron speaks 
in elegant terms, but I prefer to think about this as a problem similar to 
science fiction movies that permit time travel, which end up with mind-
bending (and heart-rending) scenarios of "what-might-have-beens." 
We can try to unravel what would have been by utilizing typical 
principles of tracing and causation. Or we can search for alternative 
measures, such as what helps to best promote the future interests of 
the group that has been harmed. It may be impossible to know what 
would have happened to individuals without past injustice-although 
we can often trace out the harms they have suffered.160 It is possible, 
however, for a legislature to make judgments about the magnitude of 
harm and then to take steps to repair that harm. Another alternative, 
given the complexity of what-might-have-beens in the slavery context, 
is to think more about community-based repair. 161 
Many reparationists focus on community-based remedies, which 
draw more upon analogies to structural injunctions and other class 
action remedies, than upon payments to individuals. Such remedies, 
which focus on community-building, like health and education funds, 
could be aimed at entire communities. In those cases, we should con-
sider using tort principles of causation as a means of apportioning 
moral culpability. Reparations is a moral as much as a legal struggle-
and one that requires changing the hearts and minds of Americans. 
The vanguard may very well come through the courts, but this is a 
struggle that will succeed by moral persuasion. 
pers Series, 2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/soI3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=404 
940. See ErnestJ. Weinrib, ComctiveJustice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 403, 412 (1992). 
160 The thing to think about in this context may not be where an individual descended 
from enslaved people would be without the slavery, but how much harm has that individ-
ual suffered? In the former calculus, the question involves complex issues of proof of 
where someone might have ended up. The later calculus involves only questions of how 
much one has been disadvantaged. 
161 See JOHN GREENLEAF WHITnER, Maud Afuller, in THE COMPLETE POETICAL WORKS 
OF WHITTIER 48 (1848) ("For of all sad words of tongue or pen, The saddest are these: 'It 
might have been!"'). 
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In the context of Tulsa, we can see problems emerging regarding 
how to form an argument that grants reparations to individuals, as well 
as to the larger community. We have already had important reparations 
in Tulsa-a state truth commission that acknowledged the culpability of 
the government and then an apology from the state.162 There are 
significant questions, unfortunately, about how much these means of 
redress have helped Tulsa heal itself. As an observer of the riot commis-
sion process, I must confess that the riot commission stirred painful 
emotions. I hope that it has led many in Tulsa to believe that the city 
cares about recovering the history-and respecting the memory-of all 
of Tulsa's citizens, not just those who were the "victors" in the Tulsa 
tragedy.163 Hopefully such acknowledgment will lead to a greater sense 
of community and respect for others. Perhaps that greater respect, 
which is endorsed by the government in the form of the Riot Commis-
sion Report and legislation, is the most that one can hope for. It may 
also be a great victory-for it will likely influence how subsequent gen-
erations view themselves and others. 
CONCLUSION 
There are two ways of viewing tort law in the debate over repara-
tions for racial crime. First-and most commonly-tort law is a way of 
providing substantive relief through the courts. In some cases, tort law 
may actually provide relief: where there are identifiable plaintiffs, 
people who have sufficient connection to the most immediate victims 
of slavery or Jim Crow, and identifiable defendants-municipalities, 
people, or corporations164 who can be identified and held liable. In 
some instances, there are compelling justifications for tolling the stat-
ute of limitations, and, in those instances, lawsuits may offer some re-
lief to victims. 
Tort law also offers, however, a way of framing discussions of 
moral culpability. We can use analogies to tort law to apportion moral 
culpability to governmental entities (and the communities they repre-
162 Sec, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 8000.1 (West 2002) (providing legislative 
findings about the Tulsa Race Riot). The findings are reprinted as an appendix to this 
Article. Sec pages 137-38, infra. 
163 Cf ELLISON, supra note 14, at 595. 
164 See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Tulsa Reparations: The Survivors' Story, 24 B.C. THIRD 
WORLD LJ. 13, 23-24 (2004) (discllssing the challenges faced by reparations suits that tar-
get corporations); Fran Spielman, Company Admits Its Ties to Slavery, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Nov. 
24, 2003. at 9 (discussing the recent disclosure by Lehman Brothers that it purchased a 
slave in 1854, and that its principals may have owned other slaves as well). 
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sent) for their role in slavery and Jim Crow. Perhaps most importantly, 
tort law offers the possibility of framing connections between past vic-
thus and current victims-those who are suffering the harms of slav-
ery and Jim Crow today. Part of the problem with determining the 
appropriate amount of reparations is gauging the continuing harm 
that slavery has enacted upon people currently living. In that respect, 
tort law offers important analogies, which can lead to a greater appre-
ciation of how legislators could choose to remedy the harms of slavery 
and Jim Crow. The paradox continues, however, that when we are 
talking about enormous crimes like slavery, our ability to adequately 
respond diminishes. 165 We are left to struggle to find a way for the fu-
ture to deny or overcome the past. 
Whether reparations legislation is the best way of addressing both 
the inequality in income and educational opportunities, as well as the 
despair that plagues the African-American and white communities, 
whether reparations is the best way-or even an effective way-of 
achieving racial reconciliation, and whether reparations or some 
other program is the most effective way of moving towards a more just 
and humane American society, are issues best left to another day,166 
165 See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY 194 (2000). 
166 For further discussion of the conflict oyer the goals of reparations and the ability of 
reparationists to meet those goals, see Alfred L. Brophy, The Cultural Wars over Reparations 
Jar Slavery, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. (forthcoming 2004). 
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Appendix 
Oklahoma Legislature's Findings on the Tulsa Riot 
74 Olliahoma Statlltes A.llnotated § 8000.1 
137 
The Oklahoma Legislature hereby finds, pursuant to the final 
report of The 1921 Tulsa Race Riot Commission regarding the 1921 
Tulsa Race Riot of May 31-June 1, 1921, and the riot's place in the 
history of race relations in Oklahoma: 
1. The root causes of the Tulsa Race Riot reside deep in the his-
tory of race relations in Oklahoma and Tulsa which included the en-
actment of Jim Crow laws, acts of racial violence (not the least of 
which was the 23 lynchings of African-Americans versus only one 
white from 1911) against African-A.mericans in Oklahoma, and other 
actions that had the effect of "putting African-Americans in Okla-
homa in their place" and to prove to African-Americans that the 
forces supportive of segregation possessed the power to "push down, 
push out, and push under" African-Americans in Oklahoma; 
2. Official reports and accounts of the time that viewed the Tulsa 
Race Riot as a "Negro uprising" were incorrect. Given the history of 
racial violence against African-Americans in Oklahoma, including 
numerous lynchings by white mobs, and the breakdown of the rule of 
law in Tulsa on May 31-June 1, 1921, it is understandable that African-
Americans believe they needed to assist Tulsa police in protecting 
Dick Rowland, an African-American accused of attempting to rape a 
white woman, against an assembled white mob. The documentation 
assembled by The 1921 Tulsa Race Riot Commission provides strong 
evidence that some local municipal and county officials failed to take 
actions to calm or contain the situation once violence erupted and, in 
some cases, became participants in the subsequent violence which 
took place on May 31 and June 1, 1921, and even deputized and 
armed many ,vhites who were part of a mob that killed, looted, and 
burned down the Greenwood area; 
3. The staggering cost of the Tulsa Race Riot included the deaths 
of an estimated 100 to 300 persons, the vast majority of whom were 
African-Americans. It also included the destruction of 1,256 homes, 
virtually every school, church and business, and a library and hospital 
in the Greenwood area, and the loss of personal property caused by 
rampant looting by white rioters. The Tulsa Race Riot Commission 
estimates that the property costs in the Greenwood district was [sic] 
approximately $2 million in 1921 dollars or $16,752,600 in 1999 dol-
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lars. Nevertheless, there were no convictions for any of the violent acts 
against African-Americans or any insurance payments to African-
American property owners who lost their homes or personal property 
as a result of the Tulsa Race Riot. Moreover, local officials attempted 
to block the rebuilding of the Greenwood community by amending 
the Tulsa building code to require the use of fire-proof material in 
rebuilding the area thereby making the costs prohibitively expensive; 
4. Perhaps the most repugnant fact regarding the history of the 
1921 Tulsa Race Riot is that it was virtually forgotten, with the notable 
exception of those who witnessed it on both sides, for seventy-five (75) 
years. This "conspiracy of silence" served the dominant interests of 
the state during that period which found the riot a "public relations 
nightmare" that was "best to be forgotten, something to be swept well 
beneath history's carpet" for a community which attempted to attract 
new businesses and settlers; 
5. The work of many individual Oklahomans and now of The 
1921 Tulsa Race Riot Commission has forever ended the "conspiracy 
of silence" surrounding the events in Tulsa of May 31-June 1, 1921, 
and their aftermath. The Commission has subsequently turned the 
responsibility for how the State of Oklahoma will respond to the his-
torical record to the 48th Oklahoma Legislature; and 
6. The 48th Oklahoma Legislature in enacting the 1921 Tulsa 
Race Riot Reconciliation Act of 2001 concurs with the conclusion of 
The 1921 Tulsa Race Riot Commission that the reason for responding 
in the manner provided by this act is not primarily based on the pres-
ent strictly legal culpability of the State of Oklahoma or its citizens. 
Instead, this response recognizes that there were moral responsibili-
ties at the time of the riot which were ignored and has [sic] been ig-
nored ever since rather than confront the realities of an Oklahoma 
history of race relations that allowed one race to "put down" another 
race. Therefore, it is the intention of the Oklahoma Legislature in 
enacting the 1921 Tulsa Race Riot Reconciliation Act of 2001 to freely 
acknowledge its moral responsibility on behalf of the state of Okla-
homa and its citizens that no race of citizens in Oklahoma has the 
right or power to subordinate another race today or ever again. 
